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Introduction
Subject of the thesis
This thesis focusses on the use of Public and Private Partnerships (PPPs) for the
realization and management of public assets.
“PPPs are way of delivering and funding public services using a capital asset where
project risks are shared between the public and private sector. A PPP is defined
as a long term agreement between the government and a private partner where the
service delivery objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of
the private partner. In the PPP, the government specifies the quality and quantity of
the service it requires from the private partner. The private partner may be tasked
with the design, construction, financing, operation and management of a capital
asset and the delivery of a service to the government or to the public using that
asset. A key element is the bundling of the construction and operation of the asset.
The private partner will receive either a stream of payments from the government,
user charges levied directly on the end users, or a combination of both” (OECD,
2013).
From this recent OECD definition, it can be easily realized that the fundamental
element of a PPP is the negotiation activity existing between the public and the
private parties. This bargaining process can be initially governed by a contract
and then, when the formal agreement becomes incomplete, asks for a constructive
partnership. In the thesis I study what are the main contractual features and de-
terminants of these investment tools. I face this issue using both theoretical and
empirical analyses. In the following paragraphs I first describe the research problem
adressed by the Ph.d thesis. Then I outline which is the theory that justifies the
presence of PPPs. Finally, I briefly specify the research objectives and I describe
the structure of the research project.
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Why this thesis?
The global financial and economic crisis has caused a temporary decline in the value
of PPP arrangements, in particular in the EU (Wagenvoort et al., 2011). This
general trend in transaction volumes and values started in 2010 and has persisted
till 2013. The last year has experienced a further reduction in the number of PPP
transactions, while the average contract size is significantly increased (around 370
million during the first half of 2013 - EPEC, 2013). The conventional wisdom is
that the long-run trend in infrastructure financing and operation across countries
features a steady growth of private sector involvement (Wagenvoort et al., 2011).
The current and future relevance of the phenomenon is justified by both the theo-
retical framework and the the pratical ground that provide relevant reasons to delve
deeper into the subject of PPPs. Precisely, what drives the government choice to-
wards the use of PPPs are essentially the possibility to attract private financing
and the potential benefit in terms of efficiency improvements. On the other hand,
PPPs are defined with the use of long term contracts that are very complex and
not able to define every aspect of the investment agreements. As a consequence, the
contractual deals turn out to be not enough flexible and not renegotiation proof.
By assessing the pros and cons of PPPs, it is possible to detect which fields are more
suitable for their application and whether or not they are able to sustain the growth
of a country by improving its infrastructural equipment1 (Iossa and Russo, 2008).
This thesis aims at improving the understanding of PPPs, essentially using the
point of view of the public sector. In effect, with the theoretical models I highlight
which opportunities public institution can exploit by using PPPs, while with the
empirical analysis I study what determines the government’s choice in favor of PPPs.
Even if public institutions are the ones that are expected to benefit more from the
outcomes of this research, important stakeholders are also PPPs practitioners that
can understand what governments essentially expect from the private involvement
and, as a consequence, which is their best response to the public requirements.
1The macroecomic theory sustained by the empirical evidence emphasizes the link between the
infrastructural dotation of a country and its performances in terms of growth (both GDP and
GDP per capite).
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International State of Art
PPPs are contractual agreements that involve more parties with different levels
of information for a long term period. In this paragraph I expose which are the
theoretical basics of the PPPs literature by focusing on the role of asymmetric
information in a multiagent environment.
Traditionally, the agency theory studies how a principal can optimally set a contract
to regulate the agent’s activity where the last is more informed about his costs and
his level of effort. Starting from this insight, there is a considerable literature that
has developed the principal agent problem introducing several agents and tasks,
both in situations of hidden information and hidden actions.
Most of these papers are based on a moral hazard environment where agents are
in charge of multidimensional tasks. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) study the
optimal assignment of grouping of works to risk adverse agents, concluding that it is
optimal to allocate activities according to their measurability characteristics. Itoh
(1992) relaxes the assumption of perfect substitutability of tasks in the agent’s cost
function finding that, when two activities are complements, an additional benefit
from the induced cooperation arises2.
A different problem arises where agents are privately informed about their operating
costs and they must be motivated by the principal to truthfully reveal their informa-
tion. In such a context, Laffont and Martimort (1997) detect the incentive to collude
of several agents with private and positively correlated valuations for a public good.
Another element characterizing this type of setting is the cost of hierarchy (Gilbert
and Riordan, 1995; McAfee and McMillan, 1995). If the regulator has to provide
a product made up of complementary components supplied by privately informed
agents, the bundled supply allows to avoid an additional component of information
cost similar to “the double marginalization problem”, this benefit decreases with
correlated component costs. Dequiedt and Martimort (2004) extend the previous
framework introducing the possibility to use the contractor as an auditor for the
subcontractor. They show as the optimal organization exhibits various discrete de-
grees of consolidation depending on the cost of information sharing; precisely, low
monitoring costs and more efficient contractors increase the incentive to consolidate.
2This benefit is partially offset with correlated measurement errors due to the opportunity loose
of comparative performance evaluations.
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Finally, Palfrey (1983) analyses the choice between bundled or unbundled auctions
of a multiproduct monopolist facing incomplete information about the preferences
of the potential buyers. A large number of bidders increases the seller’s preference
towards separate auctions determining a gain of efficiency for the society.
Hidden action and hidden information are both considered by the model of Lewis
and Sappington (1997). In their setting the agent can deliver a non verifiable cost
reducing effort and he can acquire private knowledge about the environment in which
he and the principal are operating. They compare two scenarios where these tasks
are assigned to a single agent or to two different players. As a conclusion, they detect
a preference for task separation that decreases the contracting distortions allowing
the principal to create multiple desired incentives simultaneously at a minimun
cost. This possibility of acquiring information has been furtherly investigated by
several authors. Sobel (1993) studies the principal’s preference of dealing with an
informed or an uninformed agent, where the latter can receive the information before
or after the contract. He shows that the principal always prefers post contractual
information. Furthermore, gathering information can be costly, in such a case it’s
different whether the information can be acquired before signing a contract (Crémer
and Khalil, 1992) or before a contract is offered (Crémer et al., 1998). In the first
case the principal can deter information acquisition, while in the second situation
he must accomodate.
A further aspect that is partially analyzed by the contract theory literature with
multiple agents regards the sequentiality of investments. De Fraja (1999) develops a
model of incomplete contract framework where the benefit and cost functions of the
two players are linked with two-sided direct externalities. He shows that an efficient
outcome can be reached when the investment decisions are taken sequentially and the
second party that invests is risk neutral. Schmitz (2005) shifts the analysis towards a
complete contract framework characterized by risk neutral agents and unobservable
effort levels. In his model the probability of making an innovation during the second
stage depends on the result of the first phase. This sequential investment can be
managed by a single agent or the two phases can be assigned to two different agents.
When the project surplus is sufficiently small the principal should choose the first
organization, otherwise separation is preferred because it allows to save excessive
rents. Finally, Li and Yu (2011) investigates the principal bundling decision during
a procurement auction for a sequential project characterized by task externalities.
Their work can be interpreted as an extension of Palfrey (1983) in a two stage
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sequential games. They conclude that a bundled auction is preferred when the
externality between the two phases is positive or when the competitiveness in the
market of the joint task is higher with respect to the building (first phase) market.
These strands of literature emphasize several elements that also characterize PPPs
procedures, i.e: the presence of multiple agents in a context of asymmetric informa-
tion, the long term contractual relationship between the principal and the agents,
the sequentiality of investments, the existence of externalities among the different
phases of the project. Thus, it is worthwhile to develop the previous theories in the
applied context of PPPs where all elements occur simultaneously and interact with
each other.
Research objectives and structure of the thesis
My research objectives can be summarized in two points:
At first, the thesis aims at improving the theoretical analysis of PPPs by integrating
further elements that take mainly into account the presence of uncertain external-
ities among the phases of a project and the financial aspects of the contractual
agreements.
Secondly, I use empirical data to better understand what really affect the use of
PPPs and which goals governments aim to attain by choosing these investment
tools.
To reach these purposes, the thesis is structured in three chapters that are briefly
describe in the following paragraphs.
Chapter 1: Public Private Partnerships: Information Externality in Sequential
Investments
This paper studies the benefit coming from bundling two sequential activities in
a context of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). Differently from previous litera-
ture, I introduce a source of asymmetric information in the form of an externality
parameter linking the building stage with subsequent operational activity.
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Within this framework, PPPs allow the government to extract private information
about the sign and magnitude of the externality parameter and to to minimize the
informational rents needed to incentivize the builder’s effort.
Our results suggest how PPPs can become those commitment devices that force gov-
ernments to define more coherent and informed plans that optimize the first period
welfare, improving investment to reduce unexpected ex post costs (cost overruns).
Chapter 2: Public Private Partnerships from budget constraints: Looking for
Debt Hiding?
In this paper we examine whether budget constrained public authorities are more
likely to use PPP (Public Private Partnership) than tradition procurement. Then,
we study the possible mechanisms beyond this choice.
The empirical test focuses on France and consists of a two stage approach. Firstly,
we look at the impact of budget constraints on the use of PFI (Project Finance
Initiative) and we find a positive relationship. Secondly, to better disentangle the
debt hiding effect we exploit the 2011 change in the possibility to underwrite the
debt of PPPs.
We find that that debt hiding is a relevant, but not sufficient element for explaining
the budget constrained governments’ aptitude towards PPPs.
Chapter 3: Public and Private Finance of PPPs
This theoretical paper studies the effect of public and private budget constraints
on the government’s choice between Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and Tra-
ditional Procurement (TP) mechanisms. Differently from the previous literature, I
introduce private limited liability and public budget constraints in a context charac-
terized by asymmetric information. In this framework, private agents are protected
in case of bad outcomes from the probability of failure. Furthermore, public transfers
are socially costly for the government.
Under PPPs, the private consortium, thanks to its long term commitment in the
project, owns an implicit incentive to invest during the building stage. As a conse-
8
quence, the agent can accept higher levels of risks and the the government can save
money in the form of incentive rents.
This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical evidence which shows
how budget constrained governments are more apt to choose PPPs (Hammami et
al., 2006; Albalate et al., 2012; Russo and Zampino, 2010; Krumm and Mause, 2012;
Buso et al., 2013). The result is not derived from the presence of private financ-
ing, but it comes from the introduction of asymmetric information in conditions of
financial stress.
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Introduzione
Oggetto della tesi
La tesi sviluppa il tema del Partenariato Pubblico Privato (PPP) nell’ambito della
realizzazione di infrastrutture e opere pubbliche. Tali strumenti di investimento sono
stati definiti nel seguente modo dall’OCSE (Organizzazione per la Cooperazione e
lo Sviluppo Economico):
"Il PPP rappresenta una modalità per fornire e finanziare servizi pubblici utilizzando
un capitale nel quale i rischi del progetto siano condivisi tra il settore pubblico e pri-
vato. Il PPP è definito come un accordo a lungo termine tra il governo e un partner
privato in cui gli obiettivi del governo di erogazione dei servizi siano allineati con
gli obiettivi del partner privato di realizzazione di un profitto. Nel PPP, il governo
specifica la qualità e la quantità del servizio. Al partner privato possono essere as-
segnate le fasi di progettazione, costruzione, finanziamento, gestione. Un elemento
chiave è l’accorpamento delle fasi di costruzione e gestione del bene. Il partner pri-
vato può ricevere come corrispettivo: un flusso di pagamenti da parte del governo,
delle tariffe d’utenza direttamente dagli utilizzatori finali, o una combinazione delle
due modalità" (OCSE, 2013).
Da questa recente definizione dell’OCSE, si può facilmente intuire come l’elemen-
to fondamentale di un PPP sia il rapporto a lungo termine tra la sfera pubblica
e privata. Il processo di negoziazione può essere inizialmente regolato attraverso
un contratto. Successivamente, quando l’accordo formale si rivela inadeguato, vi è
necessità di un più forte rapporto di collaborazione informale. In questa tesi vengo-
no analizzate le principali caratteristiche contrattuali e le motivazioni istituzionali
riguardanti l’utilizzo e la scelta di questi strumenti di investimento. Lo studio è
sviluppato attraverso analisi teoriche ed empiriche. Nei paragrafi successivi viene
inizialmente descritta la principale motivazione di ricerca della tesi di dottorato.
Successivamente, viene presentata la teoria economica che giustifica la presenza dei
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PPP. Infine, vengono specificati brevemente gli obiettivi di ricerca e viene descritta
la struttura della tesi.
Perchè una tesi sui PPP?
La crisi finanziaria ed economica ha causato una temporanea riduzione del valore
dei PPP, in particolare all’interno dell’UE (Wagenvoort et al., 2011). Questo trend
riguardante i volumi e il valore delle transazioni è iniziato nel 2010 e si è protratto
fino al 2013. L’ultimo anno ha registrato una ulteriore riduzione per quanto concer-
ne il numero di operazioni eseguite tramite PPP, mentre la dimensione media dei
contratti è aumentata significativamente (circa 370 milioni nel primo semestre del
2013 - EPEC, 2013). Per quanto riguarda ill lungo periodo si prospetta un crescen-
te coinvolgimento del settore privato nel finanziamento delle infrastrutture e delle
opere pubbliche (Wagenvoort et al., 2011).
La rilevanza attuale e futura del fenomeno è giustificata sia dal quadro teorico che
dal contesto applicato che forniscono motivi rilevanti per approfondire maggiormen-
te il tema. Precisamente, la scelta del governo a favore dei PPP consente di attrarre
finanziamenti privati e può generare miglioramenti in termini di efficienza. D’al-
tra parte, i PPP sono definiti tramite contratti a lungo termine che sono molto
complessi e non in grado di definire preventivamente ogni aspetto dell’accordo di
investimento. Di conseguenza, le offerte contrattuali risultano, il più delle volte,
non sufficientemente flessibili e oggetto di facile rinegoziazione.
Valutando i pro e i contro dei PPP, è possibile rilevare i settori maggiormente adatti
alla loro applicazione e la loro reale capacità di incrementare la dotazione infrastrut-
turale di un paese generando, in tal modo, un effetto positivo in termini di crescita
economica3 (Iossa and Russo, 2008). Questa tesi mira a migliorare la comprensione
dei PPP, l’analisi viene sviluppata utilizzando, essenzialmente, il punto di vista del
settore pubblico. In effetti, con i modelli teorici, vengono sottolineate le opportuni-
tà per l’ente pubblico derivanti dall’utilizzo dei PPP. L’analisi empirica evidenzia,
invece, i principali fattori in grado di orientare la scelta del governo verso i PPP.
3La teoria macroecomica sostenuta dall’evidenza empirica sottolinea il legame tra la dotazione
infrastrutturale di un paese e le sue prestazioni in termini di crescita (sia del PIL che del PIL
pro capite).
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Nonostante i risultati di questo progetto di ricerca siano rivolti essenzialmente a
favore dei soggetti operanti nella sfera pubblica, anche gli attori privati operanti nel
mercato dei PPP possono usfruire di questo lavoro per comprendere maggiormente
ciò che i governi si aspettino dal coinvolgimento privato e, di conseguenza, quale sia
la risposta ottima in grado di massimizzare i loro profitti soddisfando le esigenze
governative.
Principi teorici
I PPP sono accordi contrattuali che coinvolgono più parti con diversi livelli di in-
formazioni per un lungo periodo. In questo paragrafo verranno esposti i fondamenti
teorici alla letteratura dei PPP focalizzando l’attenzione sul ruolo dell’assimetria
informativa in un ambiente multiagente.
Tradizionalmente, la teoria dei contratti applicata ad un contesto principale-agente
studia come un principale può scrivere in modo ottimale un contratto per rego-
lare l’attività di un agente che risulta maggiormente informato sui propri costi di
produzione e sul proprio livello di sforzo. Partendo da questa impostazione, la let-
teratura ha sviluppato il problema introducendo diversi agenti e diverze attività, e
considerando la presenza sia di informazioni private che di azioni non osservabili.
La maggior parte di questi lavori di ricerca sono sviluppati in un contesto carat-
terizzato da “azzardo morale”. Holmstrom e Milgrom (1991) studiano l’assegna-
zione di gruppi di attività ad agenti avversi al rischio, stabilendo come ottimale
l’allocazione degli incarichi in base alle caratteristiche e alle possibilità di misura-
bilità. Itoh (1992) rilassa l’ipotesi di perfetta sostituibilità fra mansioni diverse,
constatando l’esistenza di un ulteriore vantaggio cooperativo in presenza di attività
complementari.
Un diverso problema sorge quando gli agenti sono privatamente informati sui loro
costi di funzionamento e devono quindi essere motivati dal principale a rivelare
correttamente le proprie informazioni. In tale contesto, Laffont e Martimort (1997)
constatano come diversi agenti con valutazioni private e correlate positivamente per
un singolo bene pubblico siano incentivati a colludere tra loro. Un altro elemento che
caratterizza questo tipo di approccio è il costo della gerarchia (Gilbert e Riordan,
1995; McAfee e McMillan, 1995). Se il regolatore deve fornire un prodotto costituito
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da componenti complementari forniti da differenti agenzie con informazione privata,
il consolidamento dell’offerta consente di evitare un ulteriore componente di costo
informativo simile al “double marginalization problem” che si osserva in caso di
doppio monopolio.
Azioni non osservabili e informazioni private sono entrambe prese in considerazione
da Lewis e Sappington (1997). Nel loro modello l’agente può, attraverso un maggior
livello di sforzo non osservabile, ridurre i costi del progetto. Inoltre, è possibile
acquisire informazioni private riguardanti l’ambiente operativo. L’analisi confronta
due scenari: nel primo caso le mansioni sono assegnate ad un singolo agente; nel
secondo caso due soggetti privati si prendono carico di due attività differenti. In
conclusione, l’analisi rileva una preferenza nei confronti della divisione dei compiti
che consente di diminuire le distorsioni amministrative permettendo al principale di
creare più incentivi ad un minimo costo.
Un ulteriore aspetto che è parzialmente analizzato dalla letteratura principale-agente
riguarda la sequenzialità degli investimenti. De Fraja (1999) sviluppa un modello
con contratti incompleti nel quale i costi e i benefici del principale e dell’agente
sono collegati attraverso esternalità reciproche. Lo studio mostra come un risultato
efficiente può essere raggiunto nel caso in cui le decisioni di investimento siano prese
sequenzialmente e il secondo investitore sia neutrale al rischio. Schmitz (2005) pro-
pone un modello con contratti completi, agenti neutrali al rischio e livelli di sforzo
non osservabili. Inoltre, la probabilità di innovare durante la seconda fase progettua-
le è strettamente legata al risultato della prima fase. Tale investimento sequenziale
può essere gestito da un singolo agente o le due fasi possono essere assegnate a due
diversi agenti. Se il surplus del progetto non è eccessivamente elevato, la soluzio-
ne con un agente è ottimale, altrimenti la divisione delle mansioni è preferibile in
quanto consente un risparmio sulle rendite informative.
Questi filoni di letteratura sottolineano alcuni elementi che caratterizzano anche le
procedure di PPP, cioè: la presenza di più agenti in un contesto di informazione
asimmetrica, il rapporto contrattuale a lungo termine tra il principale e gli agenti,
la sequenzialità degli investimenti, l’esistenza di esternalità tra le diverse fasi del
progetto. Partendo dalle teorie precedenti è quindi possibile sviluppare in maniera
più appofondita il contesto teorico dei PPP nel quale tutti gli elementi precedenti
menzionati si verificano simultaneamente e interagiscono tra loro.
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Obiettivi di ricerca e Struttura della tesi
I miei obiettivi di ricerca possono essere riassunti in due punti.
In un primo momento, la tesi mira a migliorare l’analisi teorica sui PPP, integran-
do ulteriori elementi che tengano maggiormente in considerazione: la presenza di
esternalità informative tra le fasi di un progetto e gli aspetti finanziari degli accordi
contrattuali.
In secondo luogo, viene utilizzata l’analisi empirica per comprendere le determi-
nanti dei PPP e gli obiettivi perseguiti dai governi attraverso tali strumenti di
investimento.
Per raggiungere tali obiettivi, la tesi è strutturata in tre capitoli che verranno
descritti brevemente nei paragrafi seguenti.
Capitolo 1: Public Private Partnerships: Information Externality in Sequential
Investments
Questo lavoro di ricerca studia il beneficio proveniente dall’affidamento di due at-
tività sequenziali ad un singolo agente in un contesto di PPP. Diversamente dalla
letteratura precedente, l’analisi prevede la presenza di informazione asimmetrica
nella forma di un parametro di esternalità che collega la fase di costruzione con la
successiva attività operativa.
In tale contesto, i PPP permettono al governo di estrarre l’informazione privata
riguardante il parametro di esternalità e ridurre al minimo le rendite informative
necessarie per incentivare l’attività del costruttore.
I risultati suggeriscono come i PPP possano diventare quei dispositivi che costrin-
gono i governi a definire piani più coerenti e consapevoli in grado di ottimizzare il
benessere della popolazione minimizzando i costi operativi non previsti (sforamento
dei costi).
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Capitolo 2: Public Private Partnerships from budget constraints: Looking for
Debt Hiding?
In questo articolo viene esaminato il ruolo dei vincoli di bilancio pubblici nella
propensione a utilizzare i PPP rispetto agli appalti tradizionali. Successivamente,
vengono esaminati i possibili canali di trasmissione in grado di spiegare l’effetto
trovato.
L’analisi empirica è sviluppata nel contesto Francese e consiste in un approccio a
due fasi. In primo luogo, viene studiato l’impatto dei vincoli di bilancio sull’uso dei
contratti PFI (Project Finance Initiative) e i risultati evidenziano un effetto positivo.
In secondo luogo, per escludere la possibilità che tale impatto sia esclusivamente
spiegato da vantaggi contabili, viene utilizzato un cambiamento legislativo introdotto
nel 2011.
L’analisi evidenzia come, nonostante i vantaggi contabili siano rilevanti nello spiegare
l’effetto delle restrizioni di bilancio, essi non sono sufficienti a chiarire la propensione
a favore dei PPP di istituzioni con maggiori vincoli e difficoltà finanziarie.
Capitolo 3: Public and Private Finance of PPPs
Questo lavoro teorico analizza il ruolo svolto dalle restrizioni finanziarie pubbliche e
private nella scelta del governo tra PPP e appalti tradizionali. Diversamente dalla
letteratura precedente, vengono introdotti un vincolo privato di responsabilità limi-
tata e un vincolo di bilancio pubblico in un ambiente caratterizzato da informazione
asimmetrica. In tale contesto, gli agenti privati vengono protetti, in caso di risultati
non soddisfacenti, nei confronti della possibilità di fallimento. Inoltre, i trasferimenti
pubblici rappresentano un costo per la società (costo ombra dei fondi pubblici).
Nel PPP, il consorzio privato, grazie al suo coinvolgimento a lungo termine nel
progetto, è implicitamente incentivato ad investire durante la fase di costruzione.
Di conseguenza, l’agente può accettare livelli di rischio maggiori ed il governo è in
grado di risparmiare rendite informative.
Tale analisi teorica fornisce una possibile spiegazione all’evidenza empirica che mo-
stra come i governi con maggiori vincoli di bilancio siano più inclini a scegliere il
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PPP. Il risultato non è dovuto alla presenza di finanziamenti privati, ma deriva
dall’introduzione dell’assimetria informativa in un contesto di restrizioni finanziarie.
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1 Public Private Partnerships:
Information Externality in
Sequential Investments
Author: Marco Buso
Abstract
This paper studies the benefit coming from bundling two sequential activities in
a context of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). Differently from previous litera-
ture, I introduce a source of asymmetric information in the form of an externality
parameter linking the building stage with subsequent operational activity.
Within this framework, PPPs allow the government to extract private information
about the sign and magnitude of the externality parameter and to to minimize the
informational rents needed to incentivize the builder’s effort.
Our results suggest how PPPs can become those commitment devices that force gov-
ernments to define more coherent and informed plans that optimize the first period
welfare, improving investment to reduce unexpected ex post costs (cost overruns).
1.1 Introduction
The realization of a public infrastructure with the aim of providing services to citi-
zens represents a long term project characterized by several complexities that must
be adequately taken into account to achieve satisfactory results. Decisions about
the optimal strategy to realize these investments have increasingly come to coincide
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with a choice between a traditional procurement (TP) mechanism and public-private
partnerships (PPPs). In the case of TP, the public institution allocates the several
stages of the project to different private firms (unbundling), but it remains the owner
of the infrastructure, the only financer and it is fully accountable for poor results. In
the case of PPPs, a single private consortium made up of several firms is in charge
of realizing and managing the infrastructure (bundling). It can assume the role of
financer and the risks are optimally shared between public and private partners.
The literature has highlighted several advantages of PPPs over TP. First, the bundling
mechanism can create a stronger incentive to innovate and invest in the quality of
the infrastructure during the building stage (Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Iossa
and Martimort, 2008). Second, a PPP optimally allocates risks between the two
sectors. Consequentially, the private partner has a stronger incentive to apply more
effort during the operational stage. Third, this option is able to attract private
financers that can act as monitors reducing the information asymmetry between the
government and the private agent (Iossa and Martimort 2011).
Since the 1990’s, real world PPPs have become common in most developed and de-
veloping countries, in a wide array of sectors and typologies; from standard projects
where the main sources of revenues were user fees (e.g., motorways, parking facil-
ities, public transport) to very complex projects in which the private profits came
essentially from government subsidies (e.g., hospitals, schools, prisons).
Differences between theory and practice arise from the interpretation of the bundling
effect. The theory emphasizes the potential benefits of PPPs in exploiting the pres-
ence of ex ante positive externalities (Iossa and Martimort, 2008, Martimort and
Pouyet, 2008). The practice reveals, instead, the capacity of PPPs to optimally
use a particular private expertise for providing public services; i.e., the ability to
recognize innovative channels linking the different stages of the project. This paper
restores a connection between the theoretical background and the practical evidence.
Indeed, the analysis describes a model in which the working agents privately know
how and how much the two sequential investment stages are related (differently from
Martimort and Pouyet, 2008 and Iossa and Martimort, 2008). Applications of this
theoretical proposition to real world cases are represented by all those contractible
innovations related to the building stage of the project whose impact on the suc-
ceding managerial activity is not ex ante perfectly recognized by the government;
e.g., the development of an automatic metro, the improvement of the road’s safety
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net, the realization of sustainable (green) public buildings. In such cases, public
administrations know their own needs, but not what is the best way to achieve
their objectives (Iossa and Russo 2008). Long-term commitment devices, such as
PPPs, could grant institutions, politicians and administrative workers more useful
decision-making information.
The model is developed in an asymmetric information framework and it is based
on the “new economics of regulation” and contract theory approach 1. The theo-
retical methodology assumes that the principal (government) is able to write con-
tracts contingent on realization of contractible variables that are verifiable ex post2.
The “project” consists of two sequential stages that are connected through a pro-
duction externality that links the operational costs with the first phase outcomes.
The sources of asymmetric information are not limited to the externality parameter
(hidden information), they also include the efforts of the private agents that are not
directly verifiable by the principal (hidden action). The government must choose
between TP and PPPs with the aim of maximizing the net social welfare produced
by the investment taking into account the shadow cost of public funds induced by
the transfer of rents from the public to the private agents. The final results reveal
a potential ex ante advantage to choosing PPPs that increases with the extent to
which future private information is uncertain to the public buyer3. The analysis has
been further generalized by considering, as a robustness check, the possibility of the
government executing, under TP, simultaneous contracts with both agents at the
beginning of the project. The benefit of PPPs partially holds in the new framework
if the shadow cost of public funds is positive.
1.2 Review of related literature
The literature on PPPs is focused on identifying how problems, like incompleteness
of contracts and asymmetric information, influence the organizational management
of a multi-period public investment.
1This strand of literature applied to the procurement context is connected with the book by
Laffont and Tirole (1993).
2Even if this hypothesis seems too strong for very complex PPPs, real world experience shows
that verification of quality/efficiency may be relatively easier in some sectors (e.g., highway
quality) than in others (e.g., hospitals).
3That is higher when the variance of the private information parameter is higher.
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The incomplete contract approach is the more developed and it is based on a setting
in which a contract is not able to cope with every aspect of the economic relation-
ship between the partners. Starting from this insight, the model of Hart (2003)
studies the pros and cons associated with a PPP, focusing on the builder’s invest-
ment decisions in the current period regarding some public infrastructures, given his
commitment to running the infrastructure in a future period. Hart concludes that
the PPP is the best solution if the quality of the service can be well identified, while
the quality of the building shouldn’t be explicitly stated in the contract.
Following the incomplete contract methodology, Martimort and Pouyet (2008) to-
gether with Iossa and Martimort (2008) develop a two-stage model introducing an
externality parameter as a connection between the stages of the project. This pa-
rameter is known from the beginning and it is negative in cases where the first stage
investment increases the second stage costs, while it is positive otherwise. Their con-
clusion are driven by the externality variable, inasmuch as the bundling mechanism
(PPPs), which internalizes costs and benefits related to the second period activity,
is socially preferable only when the externality is positive. Martimort and Pouyet
(2008) expand their basic model to allow for general schemes4, more complete con-
tracts, and introducing an adverse selection issue concerning operating costs. They
conclude that, with a benevolent decision-maker and a privately informed opera-
tor, the optimal organizational form is still bundling (PPP) when the externality is
positive.
The potential advantages of PPPs highlighted by the literature can be partially
or totally neutralized in a context of future uncertainty (exogenous shocks) or by
considering agency problems within the private consortium. In the first case, the
PPP option implies an excessive transfer of risks to a risk adverse consortium and
a lack of flexibility induced by early commitment (Iossa and Martimort, 2008, 2011;
Martimort and Straub, 2012). In the second case, imperfect bundling leads to a sub-
optimal privately negotiated incentive structure within the consortium and reduces
the scope for welfare-improving PPPs (as compared to Traditional Procurement;
Greco, 2013).
Most of the existing literature assumes that the government is able to commit to a
multi-period contractual relationship. When that is not the case, the government
4 The builder’s payment depends on the operator’s cost.
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seeks to renegotiate the contract at the second stage of the project affecting, as a
consequence, the first period system of incentives5 (Guash et al., 2007; Engel et al.,
2009; Valéro, 2012). This problem creates contract distortions that directly affect
investment costs and successful probabilities.
With the introduction in the U.K. of the private finance initiative (PFI) program
in 1992, much emphasis has been put on the financial aspect of PPPs. The achieve-
ment of “value for money” as well as the attraction of different sources of financing
became the main goals of practitioners and public institutions when starting PPPs.
Nevertheless, the theoretical literature mainly analyzes the contractual aspects and
implications of these investments, while it is not common to approach the analysis
from a financial viewpoint. The main related contributions come from Engel et al.
(2010, 2013) and Auriol and Picard (2013). Engel et al. (2013) state the “irrelevance
result” according to which there are no public financial advantages of PPPs with
respect to TP due to the participation of private financing. Indeed, PPPs cannot
be justified by their freeing of public funds inasmuch as public sector current saving
in the form of distortionary taxation is perfectly balanced by future looses of pub-
lic revenue. Auriol and Picard compare a public regime to a build-operate-transfer
(BOT) contract for the realization of investment of public and private interests.
They build a model within a setting characterized by asymmetric information6 and
in which there is a shadow cost of public funds (λ). The analysis highlights a trade
off between the public cost of financing a project and higher prices set by concession
holders. A major role in addressing this trade-off is played by distortionary taxation.
Indeed, there exists a specific threshold λ0 such that BOT contracts are preferred if
and only if λ > λ0.
Differently from the previous literature, I develop a theoretical model with the pres-
ence of both moral hazard and adverse selection. The hidden information problem is
related to the externality parameter that connects the two investment stages, while
the hidden action issue concerns the non verifiable agents’ efforts.
The study reveals a potential benefit associated with PPPs, in a context of con-
tractible outcomes and incremental innovations. Like contributions to the literature
of reference, the paper permits one to better understand how the government in-
5At the first period contractual stage, the good firm has incentive to mimic the bad one, knowing
that the informed principal will be able to extract its surplus at the second period. This problem
is known as the “ratchet effect”.
6The concession holder faces a much weaker information asymmetry with their own manager
compared to the government.
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vestment decision is affected when the externality parameter introduced by Iossa
and Martimort (2008) and Martimort and Pouyet (2008) becomes uncertain. Fur-
thermore, the analysis goes farther than Engel et. al. (2013) by showing how the
shadow cost of public funds comes to be relevant in driving the government choice
between TP and PPPs, in a context of sequential investments of public interest with
multiple sources of asymmetric information.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3 lays out the model; Sections 4 and
5 discuss the unbundling and the bundling scenarios; Section 6 analyzes the net
surplus produced by the different scenarios through a welfare analysis; Section 7
concludes.
1.3 The Model
The government aims at the realization of a public infrastructure able to provide
services for its citizens. The project is made up of two stages: the construction of
the public asset and the provision of services.
Building phase Operational phase
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
The realized facility generates a social surplus equal to CS = S0 + S ∗ I(e1). The
surplus can be divided into two components: a constant term (S0) that depends on
the realization of the basic infrastructure and a second part that linearly depends on
an incremental innovative investment I(e1) that is contractible and increasing with
the builder’s effort (I(e1) = e1 +  where  ∼ g(0, σ2 ) and g() ∼ [l, h]). The effort
(e1) is not verifiable by the government and it implies a non monetary disutility for
the builder equal to ψ(e1) that, by assumption, satisfies the following properties:
ψ′ ≥ 0, ψ′′ ≥ 0 and ψ(0) = 0.
In the analysis the government is assumed to be benevolent and able to commit to
a long term project. It acts as a principal and writes the contracts to maximize the
social welfare function.
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WG = S0 + S ∗ I(e1) + U − (1 + λ)T (1.1)
The function is the sum of social surplus (CS = S0 + S ∗ I(e1)) and the firms’
utilities (U), net of the government’s expenses (T ) weighted by the shadow cost of
public funds (λ) that captures distortion imposed on taxpayers to collect the money
needed for the investment7.
The first stage of the project is entrusted to a builder whose utility is defined as
follows:
U1 = T1 − ψ(e1) (1.2)
The builder is in charge of the construction of the basic infrastructure, which entails
a fixed cost that is totally reimbursed and a non-monetary disutility of effort. As
compensation, he receives a transfer that increases with the level of innovation
introduced in the project.
The second stage activity is assigned to an operator who receives, in return for his
services, the following utility:
U2 = T2 − [O − e2(θ)− I(e1)θ]− ψ(e2) (1.3)
The return to the operator is composed of the gross transfer from the government
net of the monetary cost (C2(θ) = O−e2(θ)−I(e1)θ) and a non-monetary disutility
of effort (ψ(e2)). The monetary cost is verifiable and observable. It is determined by:
the fixed part O; the cost-reducing effort e2; and the impact of the first stage invest-
ment on the second phase. This last effect is driven by θ, which reflects the private
information of the operator. This parameter defines whether or not the builder’s
investment increases (negative externality θ < 0) or reduces (positive externality
θ > 0) the operational costs8. The agent is able to acquire this information during
7The model follows the approach used in the procurement model of Laffont and Tirole (1986)
8For istance, an automatic metro may reduce the need for drivers (positive externality). Never-
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the building stage when the main features of the infrastructure become observable
(this parameter can represent the combination of private information of the builder
and the operator about the cost to manage the realized asset)9. The government
cannot directly detect the private information, but it can observe the distribution
of the variable over a range of values: f(θ) ∼ [θl, θh] where ´ θh
θl
θf(θ)dθ = θ. For the
purpose of this analysis, the possible forms that f(θ) can take have been restricted
to the class of piecewise differentiable functions that allow the use of optimal con-
trol theory. A further standard requirement regards the hazard rate, F (θ)
f(θ) , that is
assumed monotonic with respect to θ: d(F (θ)
f(θ) )/dθ ≥ 010. In addition to monetary ex-
penses, the operator experiences a non-monetary cost of applying effort captured by
the function ψ(e2) that, by assumption, satisfies the same properties as the builder’s
effort: ψ′ ≥ 0, ψ′′ ≥ 0 and ψ(0) = 0.
For the achievement of the project, the government can choose between two pos-
sibilities: unbundling (TP) and bundling (PPPs). In the first case the two stages
are managed by different firms while, in the second case, there is a single private
consortium that takes care of both stages.
1.4 Unbundling
Within the unbundling (TP) scenario, the government chooses to undertake the two
stages of the project through different agents: the builder and the operator. These
players act autonomously and the government offers two distinct contracts.
In the first stage the government wants to maximize the builder’s effort, but it must
cope with a problem hidden action. Therefore, it can only offer an incentive contract
based on the level of observable and verifiable outcomes, i.e., a proportional transfer
{T1 = I(e1)t1} linking the builder’s compensation with the investment output I(e1).
theless, innovative designs or materials for the construction of sustainable public buildings can
increase social surplus, but also maintenance costs (negative externality).
9This parameter can capture, for example, the impact of the development of an automatic metro
on operational costs. The government can forecast what will be the effect of this innovation, but
only the operator is able to perfectly compare the saving of costs in the form of lower drivers’
salaries with the potential increase in expenses in the form of organizational adaptations and
new professional workers’ salaries.
10 This assumption implies that effort decreases with agent inefficiency.
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In the second stage the relationship between the principal and the agent is influ-
enced by problems of both hidden information and hidden action. The government
can offer a menu of incentive-feasible contracts based on the verifiable outcome and
induce truthful revelation of the firm’s cost parameter, that is a revelation mech-
anism
{
t(θˆ), C(θˆ)
}
θ[θl,θh]
that defines the cost that the firm has to realize and the
net transfer it will receive when the cost parameter θˆ is announced 11:
In this scenario, the contractual agreements are signed according to the following
timeline:
and
builder
Builder implements
effort (first phase)
Operator implements
effort (second phase)
Social benefit
and costs are realized
are realized
Building outcome
is realized
operator
Contract with the Contract with the
The purpose of the government is to characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria
of the overall game; the solution of this problem is standard and is found using
backward induction.
Second stage of the game
In the second stage the principal writes a contract that gives the operator incentive
to apply effort in exchange for the minimum payment of money: a rent-efficiency
trade off.
max
e2(θ)
WG2 =
´ θh
θl
{U2(θ)− (1 + λ)[t2(θ) + C2(θ)]}dF (θ)
s.t.
1- dU2
dθ
= −ψ′(e2(θ))
2- U2(θh) = 0
11As usual, we know from the revelation principle that any regulatory mechanism is equivalent to
a direct revelation mechanism that induces a truthful revelation of the firm’s cost parameter.
This regulatory mechanism can then implement the optimum through a menu of linear contracts
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
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Proof. See Appendix 2
The government maximizes the net social welfare related to the second period taking
into account the agent’s information constraints. The contract is offered at the ex
post stage, once the agent already knows his type. As a consequence, the partici-
pation constraint is binding for the most inefficient operator, who must receive at
least his reservation utility (normalized to 0) to accept the contract [2]. Addition-
ally, the government must structure the transfers to optimally induce the truthful
revelation of the private agent’s information [1]12. The problem’s solution includes
the following optimal level of effort:
eU2 (θ) = ψ′−1[1−
λ
1 + λ
F (θ)
f(θ)ψ
′′(eU2 (θ))] (1.4)
The result is standard for the literature of reference. Indeed, it underscores the role
played by asymmetric information that lowers the equilibrium value of effort, com-
pared to the first best results (Appendix 1). If the monotone hazard rate property
d(F (θ)
f(θ) )/dθ ≥ 0 holds, the solution for effort is decreasing in θ. Therefore, the dis-
tortion is lower the more efficient the firm. On the other hand, all the firms, except
the least productive, receive positive utility, and the more efficient the agent, the
higher his information rent.
First stage of the game
At the beginning of the first period the government is able to propose a contract that
specifies both the parameters defining first period social welfare and the expected
second stage value function ([V2] - the discounted surplus related to the managerial
activity; see Appendix 2).
max
e1
´ h
l
{[(S0 + I(e1) ∗ S) + U1(e1)− (1 + λ)T1] + [V2]}g()d
s.t.
12Otherwise, the efficient type would have incentive to mimic the inefficient agent.
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1- e1 = argmax
e1
E[U1]
2- E[T1 − ψ(e1)] ≥ 0
Proof. See Appendix 2
The objective function of the government is composed of the social surplus deriving
from the realization of the infrastructure, the expected second stage value function,
and the builder’s payoff net of the government’s costs, weighted by the shadow
cost of public funds. The random shock  is realized after the conclusion of the
contract. Therefore, the participation constraint is defined ex ante [2]. The incentive
compatibility constraint [1] takes into account the optimal effort choice for a given
contract that comes from the maximization of the agent’s ex ante utility. The
problem’s solution includes the following result:
ψ′(eU1 ) + λ
dT ∗
de1
= S + (1 + λ)θ (1.5)
where dT ∗
de1
= ψ′(eU1 ) + ψ′′(eU1 )eU1
The first order condition equalizes the expected marginal benefit (right hand side)
with the marginal cost (left hand size). Increasing the level of effort creates a current
benefit for the society as well as a possible future saving of operating costs when
the expected externality between the two stages is positive (θ > 0)13. On the other
hand, a greater level of effort makes the operator suffer a higher non-monetary
disutility, and marginally increase the transfer at the optimum to the private agent.
The main parameters entering Equation 5 are the expected externality value (θ)
and the shadow cost of public funds (λ). θ affects the marginal benefit negatively
or positively, depending on whether the investment realized during the first phase
increases or decreases (in expectation) the costs needed to manage the infrastructure.
λ captures the distortion imposed on taxpayers when public money is transferred to
the private builder (λdT ∗
de1
). Moreover, it enlarges the expected positive or negative
impact of the externality parameter ((1 + λ)θ).
13If the expected externality is negative (θ < 0), the total level of expected marginal benefit
decreases.
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1.4.1 A Robustness check: simultaneous contracts
The previous analysis describes what normally happens in real world situations in
which public procurement contracts related to multi-stage projects are signed and
outcomes of previous stages are already observed by both parties. As an alternative
to this strategy, the government could define ex ante, i.e., before investment begins,
all the contracts with multiple agents. This option is theoretically feasible, but,
pratically, it is not implemented. Indeed, linking an agent’s obligations to future
outcomes of different contracts is normally not allowed by the legal system.
In this section, I expand the previous framework, allowing for the possibility of
writing simultaneous contracts at the beginning. This is a theoretical exercise that
functions as a robustness check on the preceding analysis of the unbundling struc-
ture. In this scenario, the timeline of the game is as follows:
builder and the operator
Builder implements
effort (first phase)
Operator implements
effort (second phase)
Social benefit
and costs are realizedare realized
Building outcome
is observable
and
Contracts with the
Proof. See Appendix 2
The results finally obtained are described by the following equations.
ψ′(eS1 ) + λ
dT ∗
de1
= S + (1 + λ)θ (1.6)
where dT ∗
de1
= ψ′(eS1 ) + ψ′′(eS1 )eS1
eS2 (θ) = ψ′−1[1−
λ
1 + λ
F (θ)
f(θ)ψ
′′(eS2 (θ))] (1.7)
Equation 6 describes the builder’s optimal effort. Compared to the sequential con-
tracts scenario, the marginal benefit is different. Indeed, the positive or negative
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impact of the first stage investment to the second stage costs is driven by the real
value of θ which is actually defined in the ex ante contract between the government
and the operator. Equation 7 describes the operator’s optimal effort, which does
not change from the sequential contracts case14.
1.5 Bundling
Within this setting the approach and the initial assumptions are very similar com-
pared to the unbundling scenario. There is a single private agent (consortium) that
sustains a cost over the two periods dependent on the same parameters as before,
and based on an ex ante information structure that does not change with the new en-
vironment. The consortium receives compensation for its activities, which is defined
as the sum of the builder’s and the operator’s utilities:
UB = T1(e1) + T2(θ)− C(θ)− ψ(e1)− ψ(e2(θ)) (1.8)
The government can offer, in this case, a menu of incentive-feasible contracts based
on verifiable outcomes that must induce truthful revelation of the operator’s cost pa-
rameter and enhance first period investment, i.e., a triplet,
{
t1(θˆ), t2(θˆ), C2(θˆ)
}
θ[θl,θh]
,
which respects the incentive constraints and defines costs and transfers when the
private parameter θˆ is announced.
In this scenario, the time-line of the game takes the following form:
and
consortium
Builder implements
effort (first phase)
Operator implements
effort (second phase)
Social benefit
and costs are realizedare realized
Building outcome
is observable
Contract with the
14In this section, I implicity assume that the government cannot commit to leaving the agent
with a negative ex post utility. This hypothesis is plausible given that the operator gets
the private information before the activity starts. Nevertheless, if this is not the case, the
government’s optimal strategy consists of offering a fixed price contract: t2(C2) = a − C2,
where a =
´ θh
θl
{ψ(e2(θ)) + C2(θ)}dθ. The operator, as residual claimant, makes the efficient
decision, receives no rents in expectation and takes the risk of having a negative ex post utility.
Taking the analysis in this direction does not change the core results of the analysis.
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The screening strategy proposed by the government forces the consortium to truth-
fully reveal its private information when it becomes observable. The government
maximizes the net social welfare produced by the project over the two periods tak-
ing into account the incentive-feasible constraints.
max
e1,e2(θ)
´ h
l
{´ θh
θl
{[S0 + I(e1) ∗ S] + UB − (1 + λ)[I(e1)t1 + t2(θ) + C2(θ)]}f(θ)dθ}f()d
s.t.
1- e1 = argmax
e1
E[UB]
2- dE[UB ]
dθ
= −ψ′(e2(θ))
3- E[I(e1)t1 − ψ(e1) + t2(θ)− ψ(e2(θ))] ≥ 0
Proof. See Appendix 3
The government’s goals are the maximization of social surplus and the agents’ ex-
traction of rent. On the other hand, it must take into consideration the firms’
incentives and interests, which are embodied in the three constraints. The first
equation incents the agent to apply effort during the building stage [1]. The second
equation represents the mechanism needed to obtain a truthful revelation of the
private information parameter [2], while the third equation reflects the participation
constraint, which is binding for the more costly type [3]. The maximization solution
leads to the following outcomes:
ψ′(eB1 ) + λ
dT ∗B
de1
= S + (1 + λ)θ (1.9)
where dT
∗
B
de1
= ψ′(eB1 )
eB2 (θ) = ψ′−1[1−
λ
1 + λ
F (θ)
f(θ)ψ
′′(e2(θ))] (1.10)
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The operator’s level of effort (Equation 9) does not change at the optimum, com-
pared to its level under unbundling15. Equation 10 reports the builder’s effort.
Differently from the unbundling scenario, the contract with the consortium is made
before the start of the investment. Therefore, thanks to the revelation mechanism,
the information becomes contractible since the first stage and the optimal level of
builder’s effort can be set on the basis of the real value of θ announced by the
operator. A further difference with the unbundling context (both sequential and si-
multaneous contracts) comes from the distortionary cost that the society incurs for
a marginal transfer from the government to the private agent. In the case of PPPs,
the principal has the opportunity to leave the consortium with no ex ante private
rent at the optimum lowering the total marginal cost (left hand side of Equation 9).
This is possible because the government has the further ability, compared to TP,
of optimally setting the incentive compatibility transfers, while keeping the ex ante
participation constraint (over the two periods) binding.
Similarly to the previous case, the main parameters entering the outcomes equations
are the shadow cost of public funds λ and the externality parameter θ. λ increases
the marginal cost of effort, and it magnifies the effect of the externality. θ captures
the positive or negative impact of the first stage investment on the second period
costs. In contrast to the unbundling scenario, in this case, the builder’s investment
decision is directly affected by θ, and not only by its average value.
1.6 Welfare analysis
In this section we compare the bundling and the unbundling scenarios in terms of
ex ante social welfare, with the purpose of identifying the factors that drive the
choices of governments facing informational settings similar to the one modeled in
this paper.
15As in the unbundling case with simultaneous contracts, in this section, I implicity assume that
the agent cannot commit not to exit the contract when he discovers θ. This is plausible given
that the operator gets the private information before the activity starts. Nevertheless, if it
is not the case, the government’s optimal strategy consists of offering a second term fixed
price contract: t2(C2) = a − C2, where a =
´ θh
θl
{ψ(e2(θ)) + C2(θ)}dθ. In such a situation,
the bundling mechanism could further increase the builder’s effort, inasmuch as the distortion
induced by adverse selection will disappear. Alternatively, if the analysis is generalized to relax
this assumption, the potential benefits of PPPs will increase.
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The Welfare analysis is performed using the expected value of the objective function
of the government over the two periods: Eθ,[S0 + S ∗ I(e1) +U1 +U2− (1 + λ)(t1 +
t2 + C2)]. In this paragraph, it is assumed that ψ(e1) = e
2
1
2 and ψ(e2) =
e22
2 . These
functions respect the initial assumptions of the model and allow us to compute the
value of the agents’ efforts at the optimum. The analysis is reported in Appendix 4.
The result is summarized by the following formula, which describes the difference
in value functions between the levels of social welfare produced under bundling and
unbundling:
VB −VU = Wn = {RS}+ {IE} =
{
λ
2(1 + λ)(1 + 2λ) (S + (1 + λ)θ)
2
}
+
{
(1 + λ)
2 σ
2
θ
}
(1.11)
where
RS = λ2(1+λ)(1+2λ)(S + (1 + λ)θ)
2 - Rent Saving
IE = (1+λ)2 σ
2
θ - Information Externality
The result can be decomposed in two effects that are explained in detail in the
following definitions:
Rent saving effect (RS): This effect is always positive or equal to zero. It
reflects the ex ante marginal benefit to the society (S + (1 + λ)θ) deriving
from the builder’s higher investment under bundling, when λ > 0. PPPs al-
low the principal to recover the first period incentive rents during the lifetime
of the investment without affecting the second period incentive compatibility
constraint. As a consequence, the government can optimally align the agent’s
incentives and maximize the total extraction of rents16. This effect is mean-
ingful inasmuch as the contracts are costly for society (λ ≥ 0). Moreover,
the additional transfer of risks to the private consortium does not affect the
agent’s utility, because of the assumption of risk neutrality. The introduction
of a coefficient of risk aversion would have changed the final results.
Information externality effect (IE): This effect is always positive or equal to
zero. PPPs commit the government to define a more informed investment plan,
16The rent efficiency trade off is more slack.
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taking into account every short term and long term relationships between the
builder’s investment and the future stages of the project. Precisely, bundling
the two tasks allows the government to internalize the operator’s private infor-
mation in the builder’s innovative investment. This effect increases with the
uncertainty of the private information parameter; therefore, if the variance
decreases, the private information is less valuable to the operator, and there
is a lower benefit from choosing PPPs.
These effects lead to the following proposition, which summarizes the main result
of the paper:
Proposition 1: In a context characterized by non-verifiable effort and
hidden information on θ (the externality is uncertain for the government),
bundling strictly dominates unbundling when the following conditions are
satisfied:
- Long term contracts based on verifiable outcomes can be signed;
- Agents are risk-neutrals;
- Either the shadow cost of public funds or the variance of θ is different from zero.
Proposition 1 emphasizes the role of the externality parameter θ as well as the
influence of the shadow cost of public funds λ. Figures 1 and 2 help one better
understand the effects of these parameters on the government welfare function.
θ¯ ≥ 0 θ¯ < 0
RS, IE, Wn
IE
RS
W
/2
RS, IE, Wn
IE
RS
W
/2
Figure 1: Net welfare function (Wn) with respect to λ
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RS, IE, Wn
RS
Wn
IE
Figure 2: Net welfare function (Wn) with respect to θ¯
The graphs display the net welfare surplus of the government (Wn = VB − VU) and
its components (the RS and the IE effects) with respect to λ and θ¯ (the expected
externality parameter).
The IE effect linearly increases with λ, while the RS dynamic is less clear. When the
externality is positive or equal to 0, the RS effect initially rises with the shadow cost
of public funds, but it can exhibit negative dependence for sufficiently high values
of λ17. On the other hand, when the externality is negative, the threshold value of
λ that determines a change in the direction of this relationship is lower18 (Proof:
See Appendix 5). The net surplus Wn that is the result of the two effects is higher
than 0 for every value of λ, and it follows a trend that is either always increasing or
initially increasing and decreasing thereafter, depending on which of the two effects
dominates. Figure 2 shows the dynamics of Wn, IE and RS effects with respect to
θ¯. The highest gain in the form of net surplus by choosing PPPs is reached when
the expected externality is positive or very negative (Proof: See Appendix 5).
When PPPs are compared to TP mechanisms, several factors must be taken into
consideration, such as: the degree of completeness of the contracts; the presence
17When λ is very high, the level of optimal innovative investment decreases; there is less need of
incentive rents. Therefore, the potential benefit of bundling in terms of rent-saving is lower.
18When the externality is negative, a rise in λ increases the negative effect of first stage investment
on operational costs. This negative impact is internalized by the government in the form of
lower builder’s investment. As a consequence, the incentive transfers decrease and the potential
benefit of bundling in terms of rent-saving is lower.
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of asymmetric information; the degree of agents’ risk aversion; the level of produc-
tion uncertainty. This model does not aim to completely explain what drives a
government’s choice between PPPs and TP, but it develops two points previously
introduced by the theoretical literature on PPPs: the externality parameter (Iossa
and Martimort, 2008; Martimort and Pouyet, 2008) and the basic public finance of
PPPs (Engel et al., 2013; Auriol and Picard, 2013).
Differently from the previous analyses, it has been assumed that the government
does not know ex ante the real impact of the first stage investment on operational
costs. This assumption is plausible in contexts where the first period investment is
not standard, but its short term and long term effects are ex ante measurable. Thus,
the government cannot rely on previous experience, while the agent is able, through
its better market knowledge, to assess the long term implications of the investment.
Within this framework, bundling dominates unbundling not only when the first
stage investment decreases the operational costs (Iossa and Martimort, 2008; and
Martimort and Pouyet, 2008), but also when the externality is negative. Indeed,
bundling two tasks allows the government to extract through the contract, ex ante,
the private information of the operator. Considering this externality, the principal
has the opportunity to establish a more informed investment plan capable of either
incenting the builder’s effort, when the externality is positive, or avoiding excessive
operational costs and rents, when the externality is very negative. It is no longer the
sign that is the main driver of the analysis, but the results are finally determined by
the variance of the externality parameter and by the size of the expected externality
value (either negative or positive)19. Whether it is the sign, the size or the variance
of the externality that matters for the optimal organizational choice depends on the
presence of asymmetric information about θ, on the level of completeness of the
contract and on the degree of risk aversion of the private agents.
As a further contribution, this paper focuses on the impact of PPPs on the gov-
ernment budget. Engel et al. (2013) show that PPPs do not release public funds.
Therefore, the distortionary cost of taxation is not a rationale for the use of PPPs.
This paper goes farther in the analysis, introducing a situation of multiple asymmet-
ric information in multi stage public investment. In such a context, PPPs commit
the agent not to exit the contract, accounting for the fact that he can experience a
second period incentive transfer of money. As a consequence, the government can op-
19Fig. 2 shows how the net welfare function of the government increases when the size of the
expected externality (positive or negative) is greater.
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timize first stage investment, maximizing total rent extraction. Thus, the relevance
of λ is driven by the asymmetry of information, and it depends on the government’s
ability to optimally enhance the builder’s investment at minimum cost. Elements
that do not affect the analysis are, instead, the share of private financing and the
nature of the agents’ revenues (user fees or government transfers)20.
1.6.1 A Robustness check: simultaneous contracts
In the unbundling scenario, the government can theoretically execute the contracts
with both the builder and the operator before starting the project. In such a frame-
work, the welfare function produced under unbundling is modified. As a conse-
quence, the difference in value functions between the two scenarios changes (Ap-
pendix 5), and this is summarized by the following formula:
VB−V SU = {RS}+
λ
(1 + 2λ) {IE} =
{
λ
2(1 + λ)(1 + 2λ) (S + (1 + λ)θ)
2
}
+
{
λ(1 + λ)
2(1 + 2λ)σ
2
θ
}
(1.12)
When compared to the standard case, we observe that the two effects still hold in
the new environment, but the IE impact is weakened. Indeed, if simultaneous con-
tracts can be written, the government is also able to extract the private information
of the operator in the undundling scenario ex ante. Thus, the benefits of PPPs
decrease. What drives the result described by Equation 12 is the hidden action
problem that complicates the building stage. In fact, under PPPs, the government
can optimally make the first stage investment at minimum cost, while, under TP, it
is more costly for the government to define the incentive mechanism and, hence, the
impact of the externality on the optimal builder’s investment is also reduced. The
main consequences of this change are described by the following proposition:
20These final results are in accordance with Engel et. al. (2007) and come from a different channel
with respect to the one highlighted by Auriol and Picard (2013).
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Proposition 2: In a context characterized by simultaneous contracts, non-
verifiable effort and hidden information on θ , bundling strictly dominates
unbundling when the following conditions are satisfied:
- Long term contracts based on verifiable outcomes can be signed;
- Agents are risk-neutral;
- The shadow cost of public funds (λ) is strictly positive.
Proposition 2 differs from Proposition 1 essentially in the role played by the shadow
cost of public funds. Indeed, where λ is equal to 0, the two scenarios are identical. In
conclusion, when simultaneous contracts are written, the difference in value functions
between bundling and unbundling is less dependent on the variance of the externality
parameter (σ2θ), but more related to the shadow cost of public funds (λ).
1.7 Conclusion
This paper discusses the choice between PPPs and TP mechanisms for the realization
and management of long term projects in contexts where the future consequences of
short term investment are uncertain and governments do not share all the relevant
information known to private agents.
The study focuses on the role of the externality between the building and the oper-
ational stage, treating it as the main source of asymmetric information. Differently
from previous results in the literature, in the current analysis, the comparison be-
tween PPPs (bundling) and TP (unbundling) does not depend only on how and how
much the different activities of the project are related, but it is also related to prior
government knowledge. More precisely, when the effects of first stage investment on
the operational stage are very uncertain, the government is pushed toward PPPs,
which permit it to extract, ex ante, the agent’s private information and to optimally
control, as a consequence, the builder’s investment.
When looking at real world cases, this effect can help us to understand why cost
overruns are lower when PPPs are used (EPEC 2011, EIB 2005). In infrastructure
projects, estimated costs are often different from their ex post realizations. One
explanation for this gap derives from the substantial uncertainty that characterizes
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ex ante evaluations. PPPs allow the government to collect more information at the
beginning of the project. As a consequence, ex ante evaluations are more precise
and large cost overruns less likely.
Another result of the analysis is that, the shadow cost of public funds (λ), is relevant
to social welfare. In fact, when asymmetric information is introduced in projects
with interrelated sequential stages, PPPs facilitate government’s task, allowing it to
put in place an incentive mechanism that takes the two stages of the project into
account at the beginning. Accordingly, incentives are more aligned, and performance
rents become less costly to society.
The implication is that PPPs are particularly advantageous when long term risks
associated with public investments are not easily assessed ex ante by governments,
but performance can be verified ex post. Neither standardized projects nor R &
D investments meet this requirement. What matters is both the ability of private
agents to use their special expertise to evaluate innovative projects and the ability
of governments to execute contracts on the basis of future outcomes. (All projects
that involve new applications of existing innovations are suitable examples of the
case of interest.) The advantage of PPPs increases when the initial investment is
particularly important, in expectation, to the second period activity, or in situations
of public budget stress. In both cases, PPPs imply substantial gains in the form of
fewer cost overruns and lower incentive rents.
Several extensions could enrich the current analysis.
Different degrees of contracts’ completeness couls be introduced. Depending on the
ability of governments to write contracts based on verifiable future outcomes, the
analysis would be more or less driven by the sign of the externality (incomplete con-
tract - Iossa and Martimort, 2008; Martimort and Pouyet, 2008) or by the variability
of the externality (more complete contracts).
In this paper, I have shown how governments, using PPPs, can optimally put in place
an incentive mechanism maximizes the agents’ rent extraction. As a consequence,
the private consortium is left with a binding ex ante participation constraint, while
its ex post utility, compared to the TP scenario, is more likely to decline. This
additional uncertainty does not represent a cost in a context of risk neutrality, but
if agents are risk averse the benefit of PPPs’ in terms of rent saving will be lower.
In the model it has been assumed that there is no divergence of objectives within the
consortium. Therefore, perfect sharing of information and profits among consortium
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participants can be attained. As a further refinement, this assumption could be
relaxed (Greco 2013). In such a case, PPPs would guarantee neither the complete
extraction of information nor the perfect cost-minimizing alignment of incentives.
The degree to which the results came to be relevant in this more general framework
would depend on the information structure within the private consortium.
Finally, it is important to highlight that the preceding study is based on the assump-
tion that the government can commit to long term contracts. If this is not the case,
the principal has the incentive to extract all the second stage rent after the revela-
tion of the operator type, upon execution of the initial contract. Anticipating this
strategy, the consortium seeks to maximize its first period payoff, and a separating
contract is not always implementable (ratchet effect)21. What would be an interest-
ing refinement of the preceding analysis would be an extension designed to assess
the robustness of the final results to different degrees of government commitment.
21This problem has already been investigated by Valéro (2012), who shows how, even under gov-
ernment opportunism, there is the possibility of welfare improving PPPs.
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1.8 Appendix
1 - First Best Benchmark
The government maximizes the total welfare function, there are no problems of
hidden information or hidden action
max
e1,e2(θ)
´ +
− {S0 + I(e1) ∗ S − (1 + λ)[I(e1)t1 + t2(θ) + C2(θ)]
+I(e1)t1 + t2(θ)− ψ(e1)− ψ(e2(θ))}g()d
The government can totally extract agents’ rents
max
e1,e2(θ)
´ +
− {S0 + I(e1) ∗ S − (1 + λ)[ψ(e1) + ψ(e2(θ)) + C2(θ)]}g()d
Optimizing w.r.t. e1 and e2(θ) yelds respectively
ψ′(eFB1 )(1 + λ) = S + (1 + λ)θ
ψ′(eFB2 (θ)) = 1
2 - Proof of the Unbundling Problem
Let us solve the problem backward
Second stage of the game
The government maximizes the second stage welfare function taking into account
the operator’s incentive constraints:
max
e2(θ)
´ θh
θl
{t2(θ)− ψ(e2(θ))− (1 + λ)[t2(θ) +O − e1θ − e2(θ)]}dF (θ)
s.t.
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1- dU2
de2(θ) = −ψ′(e2(θ))
2- U2(θh) = 0
The ex post participation constraint is binding for the least efficient agent. The
incentive compatibility constraint that derives from the application of the envelope
theorem allows us to compute the agent’s utility
U(θ) =
´ θh
θ
ψ(e2(θ˜))dθ˜ + U(θh)
Integrating by parts we can compute the expected rent granted to the operator by
the principal
´ θh
θl
{U(θ)}f(θ)dθ = ´ θh
θl
{´ θh
θ
ψ(e2(θ˜))dθ˜}f(θ)dθ =
´ θh
θl
{F (θ)
f(θ)ψ
′(e2(θ))}f(θ)dθ
Substituting the constraints into the government’s function, we obtain the principal’s
optimization problem:
max
e2(θ)
W2 =
´ θh
θl
{−(1 + λ)[O − e1θ − e2(θ) + ψ(e2(θ))]− λ[F (θ)f(θ)ψ′(e2(θ))]}f(θ)dθ
Optimizing w.r.t. e2 yelds to the optimal level of effort, just like is reported in the
text
ψ′(eU2 (θ)) = 1− λ1+λ F (θ)f(θ)ψ′′(eU2 (θ))
Substituting the optimal level of effort in the objective function of the government
and solving the integral, we obtain the value function of the government
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V2 = −O + (1 + λ)e1θ −
´ θh
θl
{(1 + λ)[−eU2 (θ) + (e
U
2 (θ))2
2 +
λ
1+λ
F (θ)
f(θ)ψ
′′(eU2 (θ))]}f(θ)dθ
First stage of the game
The government maximizes the sum of the first stage welfare function and the second
stage value function taking into account the builder’s incentive constraints:
max
e1
´ h
l
{S0 + I(e1) ∗ S − (1 + λ)[I(e1)T ] + I(e1)t1 − ψ(e1) + V2}g()d
s.t.
1- dE[U1]
de1
= 0
2- E[I(e1)t1 − C1 − ψ(e1)] ≥ 0
From the incentice compatibility constraint we can compute the marginal transfer
at the equilibrium t1 = ψ′(e1); from the participation constraint we obtain the ex
ante expected utility: E[U1] = e1t1 − ψ(e1). Substituting into the government’s
function, we get the principal’s optimization problem:
max
e1
W1 = e1 + S − (1 + λ)[e1ψ′(e1)] + e1ψ′(e1)− ψ(e1) + V2
Optimizing w.r.t. e1 yelds
ψ′(eU1 ) + λ[ψ′(eU1 ) + ψ′′(eU1 )eU1 ] = S + (1 + λ)θ
where [ψ′(eU1 ) + ψ′′(eU1 )eU1 ] = dT
∗
de1
A Robustness check: simultaneous contracts
From a theoretical point of view, the government can offer both the operator’s and
the builder’s contracts before the investment start. Withtin this framework, the
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government maximizes the total welfare function taking into account the incentive
constraints:
max
e1,e2(θ)
´ +
− {
´ θh
θl
{S0 + I(e1) ∗ S − (1 + λ)[I(e1)t1 + t2(θ) + C2(θ)]
+I(e1)t1 + t2(θ)− ψ(e1)− ψ(e2(θ))}f(θ)dθ}g()d
s.t.
1- dE[U1]
de1
= 0
2- E[U1] ≥ 0
3- dU2
dθ
= −ψ′(e2(θ))
4- Uh2 ≥ 0
Substituting the constraints into the government’s objective function we obtain the
principal’s maximization problem:
max
e1,e2(θ)
WS =
´ θh
θl
{S0 + e1S − (1 + λ)[e1t1 + ψ(e2(θ)) +O − e1θ − e2(θ)]
+e1t1 − ψ(e1)− λ[F (θ)f(θ)ψ′(e2(θ))]}f(θ)dθ
Optimizing w.r.t. e1 and e2(θ) yelds respectively
ψ′(eS1 ) + λdT
∗
de1
= S + (1 + λ)θ
ψ′(eS2 (θ)) = 1− λ1+λ F (θ)f(θ)ψ′′(eS2 (θ))
3 - Proof of the Bundling Problem
The government maximizes the total welfare function taking into account the con-
sortium’s incentive constraints:
max
e1,e2(θ)
´ h
l
{´ θh
θl
{S0 + I(e1) ∗ S − (1 + λ)[I(e1)t1 + t2(θ) +O − I(e1)θ − e2(θ)]
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+I(e1)t1 + t2(θ)− ψ(e1)− ψ(e2(θ))}f(θ)dθ}g()d
s.t.
1- dE[UB ]
de1
= 0
2- dE[UB ]
dθ
= −ψ′(e2(θ))
3- E[I(e1)t1 + t2(θh)− ψ(e1)− ψ(e2(θh))] ≥ 0
From the incentive compatibility constraint related to the first phase of the project
we obtain t1 = ψ′(e1). Substituting in the participation constraint we get the
following ex ante utility: E[UB] = e1ψ′(e1) + t2(θh)− ψ(e1) + ψ(e2(θh)) = 0. Given
that the government aims at the agent’s rent extraction and considering that the
consortium is not protected by a limited liability constraint, the principal can set
the second period transfer equal to t2(θh) = ψ(e1) + ψ(e2(θh)) − e1ψ′(e1). As a
consequence, the participation constraint is ex ante binding for the least efficient
operator, while the private incentive compatibility constraints remain effective. The
obtained government’s welfare function is defined as follows:
max
e1,e2(θ)
WB =
´ θh
θl
{S0 + e1S − (1 + λ)[ψ(e1) + ψ(e2(θ)) +O − e1θ − e2(θ)]
−λ[F (θ)
f(θ)ψ
′′(e2(θ))]}f(θ)dθ
Optimizing w.r.t. e1and e2(θ) yelds respectively
ψ′(eB1 ) + λ
dT ∗B
de1
= S + (1 + λ)θ
where dT
∗
B
de1
= ψ′(eB1 )
ψ′(eB2 (θ)) = 1− λ1+λ F (θ)f(θ)ψ′′(eB2 (θ))
4 - Welfare Analysis
The expected function that is used to perform the comparative statics analysis is
the following one:
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´ θh
θl
{S0 + e1S − (1 + λ)[e1t1 + t2(θ) +O − e1θ − e2(θ)]
+(e1t1 − ψ(e1)) + (t2(θ)− ψ(e2(θ))}f(θ)dθ
Using the new effort functions the first order conditions in the bundling case become:
eB1 =
S+(1+λ)θ
1+λ
eB2 (θ) = 1− λ1+λ F (θ)f(θ)
Substituting in the government objective formula we obtain the value function under
bundling:
VB =
´ θ
θ
{S0 + SeB1 − (1 + λ)[ (e
B
1 )2
2 +
(eB2 )2
2 +O − eB1 θ − eB2 (θ)]
−λ[F (θ)
f(θ)ψ
′′(e2(θ))]}f(θ)dθ
Differences between the two scenarios come from the builder’s effort; hence the
analysis is developed using only factors dependent on eB1
VB =
´ θ
θ
{ S21+λ + θS − (1 + λ)[ S
2
2(1+λ)2 +
θ2
2 +
Sθ
1+λ − θS1+λ − θ2]}f(θ)dθ
VB =
´ θ
θ
{ S21+λ + θS − (1 + λ)[ S
2
2(1+λ)2 − θ
2
2 ]}f(θ)dθ
VB =
´ θ
θ
{ S22(1+λ) + θS + (1+λ)θ
2
2 }f(θ)dθ
VB = S
2
2(1+λ) + θ¯S +
(1+λ)
2 E[θ
2]
The new efforts functions applied to the unbundling case yelds respectively
eU1 =
S+(1+λ)θ
1+2λ
eU2 (θ) = 1− λ1+λ F (θ)f(θ)
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Substituting in the government objective formula we obtain the value function under
unbundling:
VU =
´ θ
θ
{S0 + SeU1 − (e
U
1 )2
2 (1 + 2λ)− (1 + λ)[ (e
U
2 )2
2 +O − eU1 θ − eU2 (θ)]
−λ[F (θ)
f(θ)ψ
′′(e2(θ))]}f(θ)dθ
Differences between the two scenarios come from the builder’s effort; hence the
analysis is developed using only factors dependent on eU1
VU =
´ θ
θ
{ S21+2λ − Sθ(1+λ)1+2λ − ( S
2
2(1+2λ) +
(1+λ)θS
(1+2λ) +
θ
2(1+λ)2
2(1+2λ) )
−(1 + λ)[− θS1+2λ − θθ(1+λ)1+2λ ]}f(θ)dθ
VU =
´ θ
θ
{ S22(1+2λ) + (1+λ)θS1+2λ − θ
2(1+λ)2
2(1+2λ) +
θθ(1+λ)2
1+2λ }f(θ)dθ
VU = S
2
2(1+2λ) +
(1+λ)θ¯S
1+2λ +
θ
2(1+λ)2
2(1+2λ)
The net welfare gain of governments when using PPPs is equal to:
VB − VU = λS22(1+λ)(1+2λ) + λθS1+2λ + (1+λ)2 σ2θ + λ(1+λ)2(1+2λ)θ
2
VB − VU = λ2(1+λ)(1+2λ)(S2 + (1 + λ)2θ
2 + 2(1 + λ)θS) + (1+λ)2 σ
2
θ
VB − VU = λ2(1+λ)(1+2λ)(S + (1 + λ)θ)2 + (1+λ)2 σ2θ
A Robustness check: simultaneous contracts
Differences between the two scenarios come from the builder’s effort; hence the
analysis is developed using only factors dependent on eS1
V SU =
´ θ
θ
{ S21+2λ − Sθ(1+λ)1+2λ − ( S
2
2(1+2λ) +
(1+λ)θS
(1+2λ) +
θ2(1+λ)2
2(1+2λ) )
−(1 + λ)[− θS1+2λ − θ
2(1+λ)
1+2λ ]}f(θ)dθ
V SU =
´ θ
θ
{ S22(1+2λ) + (1+λ)θS1+2λ − θ
2(1+λ)2
2(1+2λ) +
θ2(1+λ)2
1+2λ }f(θ)dθ
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V SU = S
2
2(1+2λ) +
(1+λ)θ¯S
1+2λ +
(1+λ)2
2(1+2λ)E[θ
2]
The net welfare gain of governments when using PPPs is equal to:
VB − V SU = λS
2
2(1+λ)(1+2λ) +
λθS
1+2λ +
λ(1+λ)
2(1+2λ)E[θ
2]
VB − V SU = λ2(1+λ)(1+2λ)(S2 + (1 + λ)2θ
2 + 2(1 + λ)θS) + λ(1+λ)2(1+2λ)σ
2
θ
VB − V SU = RS + λ(1+2λ)IE
5 - Comparative Statics Analysis
RS = λ2(1+λ)(1+2λ)(S + (1 + λ)θ)
2
dRS
dλ
= (S + (1 + λ)θ)2(2(1+λ)(1+2λ)−2(3+4λ)λ4(1+λ)2(1+2λ)2 ) +
λ
2(1+λ)(1+2λ)2θ(S + (1 + λ)θ)
dRS
dλ
= (S + (1 + λ)θ)2(2(1+3λ+2λ2)−(6+8λ)λ4(1+λ)2(1+2λ)2 ) +
λ
2(1+λ)(1+2λ)2θ(S + (1 + λ)θ)
dRS
dλ
= (S + (1 + λ)θ)2( (1−2λ2)2(1+λ)2(1+2λ)2 ) +
λ
2(1+λ)(1+2λ)2θ(S + (1 + λ)θ)
• (S + (1 + λ)θ)2( (1−2λ2)2(1+λ)2(1+2λ)2 ) < 0 if
1√
2 ≤ λ ≤ 1
• λ2(1+λ)(1+2λ)2θ(S + (1 + λ)θ) < 0 if θ < 0 (negative externality)
Comparative statics analysis of the RS effect with respect to θ
RS = λ2(1+λ)(1+2λ)(S + (1 + λ)θ)
2
dRS
dθ
= λ22(1+λ)(1+2λ)2(S + (1 + λ)θ)
• dRS
dθ
> 0 if S > −(1 + λ)θ
• dRS
dθ
= 0 if S = −(1 + λ)θ
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• dRS
dθ
< 0 if S < −(1 + λ)θ
Comparative statics analysis of the IE effect with respect to λ
IE = (1+λ)2 σ
2
θ
dIE
dλ
= σ
2
θ
2 ≥ 0
Comparative statics analysis of the IE effect with respect to σ2θ
IE = (1+λ)2 σ
2
θ
dIE
dσ2
θ
= (1+λ)2 ≥ 0
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2 Public Private Partnerships from
budget constraints: Looking for
Debt Hiding?
Author: Marco Buso, Frédéric Marty, Phuog Tra Tran
Abstract
In this paper, we examine whether budget constrained public authorities are more
likely to use PPP (Public Private Partnership) than traditional procurement meth-
ods. Then, we study the possible mechanisms beyond this choice. Our empirical
test focuses on France and consists of a two stage approach. Firstly, we look at the
impact of budget constraints on the use of PFI (Project Finance Initiative) and we
find a positive relationship. Secondly, to better disentangle the debt hiding effect,
we exploit the 2011 change in the ability to underwrite PPP debts. We find that
that debt hiding is a relevant, but not sufficient element for explaining the budget
constrained governments’’ attitudes towards PPPs.
2.1 Introduction
Over the past few years, governments’ behaviors and policies have heen significantly
affected by public finance constraints stemming from domestic policies, financial
markets, or regulatory measures. One prominent example is the deficit and debt
limits imposed by the European Union according to the terms of the 1992 Maas-
tricht Treaty. As a consequence, available resources to pursue puhlic investment
strategies have heen increasingly rationed, a process that in turn makes the effi-
cient organizational structure crucial for the realization and management of public
investment.
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An alternative to the conventional provision of public infrastructures (traditional
procurement) are fixed-price risk-transfer contracts, such as the the “Contrat de
Partenariat” in France (thereafter PFI/CP)1. These contracts fall within the defi-
nition of public private partnerships (PPPs), i.e., contractual agreements allowing
the involvement of the private sector’s capital and expertise for the realization and
management of an asset that will be returned to the public sector after an adequate
period of time (the “bundling” mechanism after Hart, 2003).2
Our hypothesis builds on earlier literature examining the costs and benefits of PPP.
First, theory underlines the use of these contracts can release public funds for al-
ternative uses thanks to the introduction of private knowledge or financing and
due to the stronger involvement of agents in the project (Auriol and Picard, 2013;
Buso, 2014). Second and nevertheless, since PFI first emerged as a financing option,
these contracts have been considered very costly in comparison to traditional pro-
curements (TP) because of their higher financing costs and need to realize private
projects. Furthermore, given the Eurostat rule of 2004 allowing public investments
under PPPs to be accounted as being off the balance sheet,3 these contractual or-
ganizations are often accused of being used specifically for debt hiding motivations
(OECD, 2009; NAO, 2011; PwC, 2010), and thus their use can be related to polit-
ical matters. In summary, the use of PFI can reflect motivations other than cost
savings, and their use does not clearly emerge to fill the role created by increased
the public budget constraints. However, few empirical studies explicitly address this
topic (Russo and Zampino, 2010; Krumm and Mause, 2012).
Filling this gap, our analysis aims at improving understanding of the public finance
implications of PPPs by answering the following questions: Are governments more
tempted to use PPPs under budget constraints conditions? If so, what can explain
this behavior? Hence, we first investigate the effect of governments budget con-
straints on the use of PPPs. We then examine whether or not the higher/lower
propensity of investment in PPPs from financially distressed institutions results
1The first “Private Finance Initiative” was created in the UK in 1992, followed by the “Contrat
de partenariat” in France in 2004, under the Ordonnace n°2004-559 of June 17, 2004, then
improved by the French PPP Law of the July 28, 2008.
2All PPPs require an adequate transfer of risk from the public to the private partners. PFI/CPs
are different than other types of PPPs, i.e. concessions, because of the risks transferred during
the operational phase: availability risk under a PFI/CP, demand risk under a concession.
3From a legal perspective, PPPs (therefore PFI/CP) are classified off-balance sheet for gov-
ernments, as the private partner bears both the construction risk and at least one of either
availability or demand risk.
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from a real saving/waste of public resources or a virtual withdrawal of costs from
governments budgets (debt hiding)4.
We shed light on these questions through an empirical analysis covering French
municipalities. The French context offers an appealing case study for three reasons.
First, we can investigate the totality of PFI/CP contracts5 thanks to a collaboration
with the French PPP taskforce sieged at the Ministry of Finances and Economy
(thereafter MaPPP)6. Second, the French Ministry of Finances and Economy has
made available a panel of financial budget information about municipalities.7 Third,
the municipality level has the majority of PFI/CP contracts among local public
authorities (101/138).8
We compare our sample of municipalities, namely, those having at least one PFI/CP,
with an adequate control group composed of municipalities with the same potential
demand for long-term public investment. This allows us to analyze how budget con-
straints impact a government’s choice of PFI/CP procedures. We then investigate
the effect of the new decree classifying PFI/CP as on balance sheet since January 1,
2011.9 This new accounting rule allows us to study the heterogeneity of the previ-
ous effect by looking at the change in sign and size of the impact when debt hiding
motivations are ruled out. We find that a strict budget constraint is associated with
a more frequent use of PFI/CP. The new rule negatively impacts both the use of
PFI/CP and the level of investment, however, the effect of budget constraints still
persist after 2011, especially when financial costs are considered. We then conclude
that the use of PFI/CP is driven by restriction of financial resources, not merely for
debt hiding motivations.
4Public investment decisions are taken at the local level, while public control of budget data
is handle at national or European levels. As a consequence of this role distribution, local
authorities are tempted to use PPPs to hide their financial conditions thanks to their stronger
possibility to be accounted as off the balance sheet. In such a way, municipalities can elude
external controls, thus releasing fictitious resources for further investments.
5All contracts taken out over the entire life-cycle are available.
6The Mission d’appui aux Partenariats public-privé (MaPPP) is the French Taskforce for PPPs.
Its role consists of: assessing PPP projects, supporting the preparation and negotiation of
procurement and contract documents, and promoting the PPP market in France.
7Financial information of all administrative levels is available at http://www.collectivites-
locales.gouv.fr/
8It is particular interesting to focus on municipalities inasmuch as budget constraint concerns are
known to increase in importance at the municipality level (Bel & Fageda 2009, JORF 2012)
9The decree enacted on December 16th 2010 required all PFI/CPs to be accounted on the balance
sheet at the date of the infrastructure delivery. This new decree has applied since January 1st
2011 to both existing and new PFI/CPs.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the related literature and
derives testable hypotheses. Section 2 discusses the French institutional context and
legal environment regulating PFI/CP contracts. Section 3 presents a description of
the the data. Section 4 explains our empirical strategy and discusses the paper’s
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Related literature and Hypotheses testing
The majority of existing theoretical papers study the welfare effects of the bundling
mechanism employed by PPPs, i.e., the assignment of different phases of a project
to a single private consortium (Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Iossa and Martimort,
2008; Hart, 2003). However, the financial implications and determinants of PPPs
have been less investigated. Related contributions have been made by Engel et al.
(2010, 2013), Auriol and Picard (2013), and Buso (2014). They study the public
finance implications of PPPs, focusing on analyzing how distortionary taxation10
can affect the choice between PPP and TP. According to Engel et al. (2013), the
higher shadow cost of public funds (λ)11 is not a sufficient argument for preferring
the private provision of services in a multiperiod context, as the resources saved by
the government during the investment’s early period are offset by giving up future
revenue flows to the concessionaire. Converserly, Auriol and Picard (2013) find that
this shadow cost λ becomes relevant in comparing the public regime with “build
operate transfer” contracts (BOT)12 for the realization and operation of a public
facility. Their paper examines a different context with respect to Engel et al. (2013);
their model assumes that the concession holder is allowed to operate under laissez-
faire regime. Furthermore, the private principal faces much weaker information
asymmetry with their own manager compared to the government. Despite following
a different approach, Buso (2014) reaches a similar result. His theoretical model
is built under the context of asymmetric information; however, the level of public
service provision is set by the government both under TPs and PPPs. Within this
framework, the saving of distortionary costs under PPPs comes from the long-term
10Costs imposed to taxpayers to collect funds for financing the investment.
11Opportunity cost from investing in this project instead of financing alternative public goods; it
can be higher when the government’s spending capacity is lower (budget constraints).
12BOT contracts are PPPs where the private partner is in charge of the building, operational, and
financial tasks.
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involvement of the private agent, which benefits the government in terms of reduced
need for investment incentives.
Conversely, most empirical papers aim at detecting the economic and non eco-
nomic factors able to explain private involvement in public services delivery (Bel
and Fageda, 2009, 2010; McGuire et al., 1987; Miralles, 2009; Dubin and Navarro,
1988; Picazo-Tadeo et al., 2012). Starting from this strand of literature, few works
focus on PPPs and their determinants (Hammami et al., 2006; Albalate et al., 2012;
Russo and Zampino, 2010; Krumm and Mause, 2012). Hammami et al. (2006)
provides a cross country analysis showing that PPPs are more frequent in countries
characterized by large markets, high demand, and good institutions. Furthermore,
past experience in PPPs as well as high government debts are important factors
in explaining the selection of this investment option. Different from the previous
study, Albalate et al. (2012) create an index that captures the degree of private
participation in each contractual form with the purpose of testing the drivers of
contract choice in agreements that correspond to different levels of private involve-
ment. They examine several political and economic variables and find that the large
private involvement is more likely in single projects than in network projects. Fur-
ther elements that explain the degree of private participation are fiscal variables and
the jurisdiction level of the debt-stress or tax burden. However, political variables
do not appear significant in explaining contractual choices. Russo and Zampino
(2010) and Krumm and Mause (2012) try to find evidence for correlations between
PPP investment and municipal budget data. Their papers cover, respectively, the
contexts of Italy and the UK. Both show strong positive relationships between the
number of PPPs and negative local budgetary outcomes. one explanation for this
result focuses on the public buyer’s opportunistic behavior. However, the possibility
(mentioned by Russo and Zampino, 2010) remains that PPPs can be used as useful
adjuvant treatment in order to overcome deficit trouble.
The above mentioned empirical studies highlight a connection between government
financial constraints and the organizational structure of public investments, but fail
to provide a motivation that explains their results. Our paper adds to this literature
in that we examine alternative channels that motivate French municipalities to use
PFI/CP instead of TP when resources are scarce. In fact, using data about PFI/CP
in the French municipality context, we aim at testing the following hypotheses:
55
Chapter 2 Budget constraints - Debt Hiding
First, we expect budget-constrained governments to choose structures able to release
public funds.
• H1: The use of PFI/CP is positively associated with public budget constraints.
Second, we expect debt hiding as a possible, but not unique motivation able to
explain the budget constraint effect.
• H2: Without debt hiding reasons, the impact of budget constraints on the use
of PFI/CP should decrease, but remain positive.
The first hypothesis tests the results of Auriol and Picard (2013) and Buso (2014)
versus Engel et al. (2013). The first contributions add to the theoretical framework
a further source of asymmetric information in the form of private constraints13 with
respect to Engel et al. (2013). This additional element is found to be determinant
in the comparative statics on the cost of public funds and it elucidates a positive
link between public constraints and use of PPPs.
The second hypothesis begins with the assumption that alternative reasons motivate
adoption of PPPs. We isolate debt hiding motivations in order to evaluate their
relevance and the extent to which it explains the budget constraint effect. The more
the accounting advantages are relevant, the more suitable Engel’s model becomes
to describe the data, while asymmetric information becomes less determinant in
explaining the budget constraint impact.
2.3 Institutional details
In this Section, we first focus on describing of French municipalities’ budget elabo-
ration and control processes. Then, we analyze how the accounting rules of PFI/CP
13In Auriol & Picard (2013), ex ante asymmetric information exists. In Buso (2013), the result
comes from the introduction of a further private limited liability constraint.
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contracts can lead to debt hiding behaviors. Finally, we present the new account-
ing rule in operation since 2011, which could limit this opportunistic motivation for
using PFI/CP.
2.3.1 French municipalities’ budgets
France has 36,000 municipalities, which are called “communes.” They represent the
fifth administrative level in France. Each has a mayor and a municipal council
who jointly manage the area’a administration, and each set have exactly the same
powers (no matter the commune’s size). In terms of investment, they are in charge
of pre-primary and primary schools, libraries, cultural and sport centers, and urban
equipments. The principle of municipal self-government leaves much freedom to
the municipality to take responsibility for its own investments, organization, and
financing. However, their budgets are constrained as they have to achieve a balanced
public account, for both investment and operations sections.
Following the General Code for Local Authorities,14 municipalities are obliged to
specify annualy their balanced budget for the coming year, which should contain
a plan for balancing their investment and the operating budgets. Operating rev-
enue is mainly composed of local taxes and government grants. Operating expenses
are those related to municipality’s on-going operation: staff salaries, infrastructure
maintenance costs, expenses related to the municipality missions, financial costs of
existing debt. Investment revenue comes from several sources. Operating budget
surpluses provide the majority of the investment budget (42% in 2012). Government
transfers and grants represent 24%, duties 10%, and finally, local taxes and loans
represent the remaining 24%.15 Investment expenses cover payment of annual debt
service, as well as new investment in infrastructure. It is important to emphasize
that France has a “golden rule” regarding the public budget: public authorities can
borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending.
As enacted in the Consitution in 2008, public accounts are required to be balanced as
a multiannual objective. This objective is controlled by two levels: the Administra-
tive Courts and the Regional Court of Accounts (Chambre régional des Comptes).
14France’s General Code for Local Authorities (Code général des collectivités territoriales - CGCT)
includes laws and regulations applied to local authorities’ three main levels: municipality,
department and region.
15Data come from the Ministry of the Interior: http://www.collectivites-
locales.gouv.fr/files/files/OFL_2013%282%29.pdf
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The first control includes the Prefect’s supervision over the effective balance of
municipalities’ accounts, as well as the possibility of administrative courts to take
actions against a Mayor’s misuse of power. The second instrument aims at check-
ing both the ex ante achievement of the balanced budget requirement and ex post
excessive deficits with respect to the balanced budget targets (5-10%16). However,
control procedures normally takes the form of support rather than sanctions.
In such a context, heavily indebted municipalities have higher levels of budget con-
straints upon their ability to achieve their infrastructures investment strategies17
(JORF, 2012). In fact, existing debt is a burden for municipalities’ operating and
investment budgets: high levels of existing debt push up financial costs (which are
part of operating expenses) and annual debt service (which are part of investment
expenses). As a consequence, these municipalities can only achieve the same level
of investment as other municipalities by taking larger and more costly loans from
commercial banks.
2.3.2 Public Private Partnership and Debt Hiding motivations
Within this context, given that PFI/CP (and PPPs in general) could be accounted
as off balance sheet following the Eurostat decision in 2004, they seemed to offer
a possible solution to circumvent budget constraints. The Eurostat rule classifies
infrastructure realized through PPP as non-governmental through the “risks and re-
wards” criterion. Following this guidance, public authorities have accounted PFI/CP
as off balance sheet when the construction risk and at least one of either availability
or demand risk are transferred to the private operator. In such a manner, PFI/CP
was accounted for the public balance-sheet based on the logic of accrual accounting:
the annual payment related to the investment, financial and operating costs was
reflected in the public account; the remaining element was accounted as a multian-
nual plan of payment in an appendix to the balance-sheet. As a consequence, debt
corresponding to PFI/CP did not appear on the public account.
This accounting rule might increase incentives in favor of PFI/CP procedures for
other reasons than the to-be-achieved target of value for money. The first level is
the budgetary level. As discussed in the Section 2.1, PFI/CP can enable public
1610% for municipalities with a population that is less than 20,000 citizens, 5% otherwise
17The Report of the Journal Officiel de la République Française stated that the level of public
investment in France had slowed down in the 1990s due to a hard budget constraint and a high
level of public debt (JORF 2012).
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authorities who do not have a sufficient capital budget to still achieve their desired
capital investment strategy. In fact, while a traditionally procured capital project
presents a significant immediate hit to the municipality’s capital budget, PFI/CP
will have a smaller (but much longer lasting) impact. Second, the French target,
in place since 2005 to reduce Public Sector Net Debt from 66% of GDP to under
60% could provide an incentive to favor PFI/CP over spending funded directly by
government borrowing. This reflects the fact that in the short term, a PFI/CP
scheme would result in reduced government borrowing and therefore a lower level of
Public Sector Net Debt. Third, the European level requirement, i.e., the Maastricht
Treaty, obliges member states to avoid excessive budgetary deficits. More precisely,
it set out that governments’ annual deficit and debt should not exceed: (a) 3% for
the ratio of planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product at market
prices and (b) 60% for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at
market prices.18 These European fiscal rules therefore both incentivize the use of
investment methods permitting off balance sheet financing rather than direct capital
spending funded through government borrowing.
As stated by the House of Commons (2011): “given the salience of the public debt
statistics in the current political climate, the attractiveness of the PFI method for
any government has been evident whether it provides value for money of not.” This
trend has been reported not only for the UK, but also for other European countries
such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland19.
At the end of 2010, the French Government decided to create a Decree on the topic
of PFI/CP accounting rules. This Decree requires that PFI/CP commitments at the
local level are no longer recognized off the balance sheet, for both existing and new
projects. Two reasons motivated this clarification of PFI/CP accounting. First, in
the UK, where the PPP experience is most advanced, the Government committed to
providing more transparency to PFI/CP. In fact, the Office for Budget Responsibility
decided to include an assessment of the impact of the PFI/CP liabilities in their fiscal
sustainability report, a break with previous years’ National Accounts (UK House of
Common, 2011). Second, the application of the International Financial Reporting
18Official Journal of the European Union, Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure, Article 1,
December 16, 2004
19The Financial Times reported that in 2002, Goldman Sachs helped Greece raise off-balance sheet
finance "by arranging a massive swaps transaction aimed at reducing the cost of financing." The
press report explained: Because it was treated as a currency trade rather than a loan, it helped
Greece to meet European Union deficit limits while pushing repayments far into the future
(Financial Times, Athenian arrangers, February 17, 2010, p7).
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Standards (thereafter IFRS) implied a switch from the “risks and rewards” criterion
to the control criteria. More precisely, under a PFI/CP, if the public authority
controls one of the following five aspects of the project, the corresponding debt
should be accounted as on balance-sheet: (a) the private operator is not able to sell
or take a loan on the equipment. (b) the occupation of the public owned domain. (c)
the definition of the equipment’s main features. (d) the public service’s management.
(e) the revenue paid to the private operator for his service. This new rule has led
to recognition on the balance sheet of the asset and corresponding debt upon the
infrastructure’s delivery. In other words, the balance-sheet records the investment’s
capital value as an asset, while the already-paid investment and the remaining debt
are recorded as liabilities. For both these reasons, we can argue that the rule is
not affected by either PFI/CP’s supporters or detractors. The new regulation’s
implementation ensures greater transparency regarding the governemental body’s
real financial situation and might significantly reduce the temptation to choose PPPs
to hide debt (Dupas et al., 2012).
2.4 Data description
2.4.1 PFI/CP database
Our data are collected in collaboration with the French Ministry of Finances and
Economy. Data for PFI/CP contracts are collected with the MaPPP department.
Information regarding investment amount, year of signature, and the contract sector
have been coded. Among the total of 138 local PFI/CP that have been signed
between their creation in 2004 and August 2013, 101 are at the municipal level.
Both very small and very big municipalities have used these measures; the smallest
municipality has 2,500 inhabitants, while the biggest has 847,000 inhabitants. They
invest an average of 25 million euros each year and are heavily indebted. Their debt
represents on average 89.7% of the budget, while the national average is 77%. Their
annual debt payment represents an average of 12% of the budget. The mayors of
these municipalities can be either right-wing (52%) or left-wing (38%).
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Figure 2.1: Number of PFI/CP per year by sector
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Figures 2 and 3 describe these municipalities’ investments in PFI/CPs. Municipal-
ities mainly use PFI/CP in the public equipment and culture & sport equipment
sectors.20 Other sectors are waste treatment/energy and construction21 (Figure 1).
In terms of number of concluded PFI/CPs, we observe a slow adoption by French
municipalities of this new type of contract. Created in 2004, PFI/CPs only became
popular in 2007, with 13 signed contracts at the municipal level. This trend can
be explained by a multistep procedure before the conclusion of a PFI/CP (Saussier
20Public equipments under PFI/CP are mostly public lighting projects. Culture and sport equip-
ments mainly consist of stadiums and theaters.
21The building sector includes schools and administration buildings
61
Chapter 2 Budget constraints - Debt Hiding
and Tran, 2012). Since then, we can observe an increasing number of PFI/CP per
year until 2011; thereafter, while the number of total contracts remains significant,
the trend turns negative (Figure 1). Our sample includes 55 contracts before 2011
and 56 after 2011 (Figure 1). In terms of amounts invested in PFI/CP, even if the
total investment amount per year decreased after 2010, the average per contract
remains fairly stable (Figure 2). It is also worth mentioning that six municipalities
have more than one PFI/CP.
2.4.2 Control group
Municipalities that invest through PPPs share similar characteristics that differen-
tiate them from other municipalities. To deal with this problem of self selection,
we create a control group of French municipalities (approximately 36000 observa-
tions) that have possibly selected alternative investment options, e.g., Traditional
Procurements. This strategy allows us to take into account the selection bias to
assess our effect of interest.
With the aim of performing a suitable comparison, we choose a matching strategy
that allows us to create a control group as similar as possible to our treatment
group in terms of observable characteristics. The use of the matching strategy as
choice-based sampling designs is already discussed in the literature (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1985; Rubin and Thomas, 2000; Abadie et al., 2007; Heckman and
Todd, 2009) and is frequently chosen in evaluation studies to reduce costs of data
collection in situations where the potential control population is much larger than
the treatment sample.
The matching variables for our treatment group of municipalities having at least one
PFI/CP are furnished by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
(INSEE). We matched municipalities in terms of their need for public investments
(population features). This strategy is coherent with our research analysis inasmuch
as we would like to test the impact of local institutional features (supply side) upon
selection of PFI/CP among municipalities with the same potential demand for these
types of investments. We captured the potential local request for PPPs through sev-
eral variables covering the years 2009, 2010, and 2011 that reflect: population size,
area, number of households, total income, total tax revenues, number of workers,
number of unemployed people, population age distribution, number of firms in dif-
ferent sectors, number of public firms and the number of SMEs (Small and Medium
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Enterprises).
The implemented procedure requires several steps. First, we estimated the propen-
sity score using a logistic regression and a nearest neighbors estimation; our depen-
dent variable is a dummy describing whether or not a municipality has undertaken
a PFI/CP investment, while the covariates are the selected matching variables.22
Second, we chose the two nearest neighbor observations in terms of propensity score
for each municipality in our PFI/CP group. In case a municipality has made more
than one PFI/CP investment, we select two control collectivities for each investment
made.
At the end of this step, we obtain a sample of 297 municipalities in which 95 come
from our initial database, with the remaining ones comprising our control group. The
dataset used for the matching strategy is the largest among those made available
by the INSEE. We further use similar variables, still furnished by INSEE, related
to the period 2000 to 2009 to assess whether or not our two groups are similar over
time. Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix report the ps test showing the similarity of
our two groups during our period of study.
2.4.3 The panel database
We merged our initial database furnished by the MaPPP with our selected control
group. The resulting database allows us to compute the effect of budget variables
on the use of PFI/CP instead of other contractual typologies. Our strategy is based
on the assumption that any observable and unobservable differences in terms of
investment demand between the two groups can be ruled out by performing the
empirical strategy only over effectively comparable observations.23 As a second
step, we gathered a panel of control data describing the supply side (municipalities’
features) from the website of the French Ministry of Finances and Economy.24
Data regards the main budget and are divided in two sections: the first is about
functioning operations, the second concerns investment commitments. For each
municipality we collect the yearly financial dimensions for the period going from
22We report the pstest that controls for the correct achievement of the matching strategy in Table
1 (Appendix)
23This assumption can seem extremely strong for a very heterogenous sample, but it is plausible
for the French system, which is characterized by a quite homogenous market and institutional
framework.
24http://www.collectivites-locales.gouv.fr
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2003 to 2012. We select covariates from both sections that reflect the investment
plan as well as the budget results and the financial situation.
In this database, municipalities are organized in 30 “reference groups” that are
created by taking into account: population size, participation in public establish-
ment of inter-municipal cooperation, and any additional tax systems adopted by the
inter-municipal institution. Public accounts provide, for each financial variable, the
average value of the municipality reference group. Thanks to this information, data
can be relativized, and we can compare different municipalities over time.25
Table 3 in the appendix gives the main budget characteristics of our dataset’s two
groups: group “PFI/CP” with 95 observations and group ”No PFI/CP” with 202
observations. All variables are defined as means over the period 2003−2012. The
level of investment in PFI/CP is on average 32.3 million euros for the first group, and
0 for the second. The first group of collectives shows a lower level of subventions from
the central level. Furthermore, they report lower levels of financial and accounting
budget results. Municipalities in the first group are more indebted than those in
the second group. Total debt in is approximately 63.6 million euros for the first
group, but only 45.2 million euros for the second. The share of debt per capita is
also higher for the group ”PFI/CP” (137% versus 112%). Conversely, we observe
a higher level of investment in all types of contractual agreements for the second
group (29.9 million euros versus 26.6 for the group “PFI/CP”). We conclude that
municipalities in the group “No PFI/CP” have their own investment strategies, but
did not choose PFI/CP as contractual agreements.
2.4.4 Empirical Variables
In this subsection, we highlight the variables we selected to investigate the effect
of budget constraints on PFI/CP investment and after the response following the
2011 introduction of the new rule. We use a panel database covering the period
2003 to 2013. Thus, all variables are defined for each municipality i and each year
t. The variables’ descriptions with the expected signs are reported in Table 4 in the
Appendix.
25In the analysis, all variables are considered as differences from the average of the reference group.
When gross variables are considered, results are not affected.
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Dependent variables
As previously discussed, we are interested in explaining the use of PFI/CP by French
municipalities. We first introduce pfi−choiceit, a variable equal to 1 if municipality
i in year t has already implemented a PFI/CP contract and 0 otherwise.
Explanatory variables
The level of each municipality’s budget constraint is measured by its level of debt
or by its capacity of self financing. Data concerns time t − 1 with respect to the
year of the dependent variables. This choice is consistent with the idea of capturing
ex ante budget constraints and avoids problems of simultaneity. The proxies we use
for the analysis are
• debtit−1: debt in euros at time t−1. This proxy allows us to take into account
the municipality’s ex ante financial situation.
• annuityit−1: installment debt at t− 1. This proxy represents the sum of debt
interest, which are also functioning costs, and debt capital repayments, which
are also investment costs. It captures the municipality’s annual debt expenses.
• net − CAFit−1: self financing capacity at t − 1. This is the municipality’s
surplus obtained from the functioning section. Net of the borrowings’ capital
repayments, these resources can be used for financing new investment. The
higher the net CAF, the more resources are available and the less strict a
budget constraint the municipality faces.
• debt− changeit−1: debt change at t− 1. This variable reports the accounting
difference between debt subscribed at t− 1 and debt subscribed at t− 2. This
proxy fails to capture as much the ex ante level of debt, but rather shows the
trends that characterized the past year.
The first measure is a stock variables that capture the municipality’s ex ante exoge-
nous situation, while the last three measures are flow variables that describe how
the municipality’s conditions change during the period preceding the investment’s
start.
65
Chapter 2 Budget constraints - Debt Hiding
Debt hiding reasons for engaging in PFI/CP in France were ruled out in 2011. We
take into account this legal discontinuity by introducing the variable rulet, which is
equals 1 for periods of time preceding 1st January 2011 and 0 otherwise.
Control variables
Given that we have a panel database and are comparing similar municipalities in
terms of population features, we select those financial covariates that vary over time
and could influence both the dependent variable and budget constraint proxy. We
consider financial variables that reflect municipalities’ capacity to deal with both
the investment’s demand and the balanced budget requirements.
We first include: current−resultit−1 which is the difference between current revenues
and current costs of municipality i at t − 1, and overall − resultit−1 which is the
difference between the current result and the outcome of the investment section of
municipality i at t − 1. These variables control for the balancing of the operating
and the investment budgets as required by the balanced budget specifications.
Then, we consider: investmentit−1 which captures the total level of investment
of municipality i at t − 1, and subventionsit−1 which reflects the level of national
support the municipality received for its investment plans at t− 1. These variables
are derived from the investment section and control for both size of the investment
plan and level of ex ante available resources.
2.5 Empirical strategies
We have available a panel database of municipalities that we use to test alternative
reasons for pursuing PFI/CP contracts, focusing on the role of budget constraints. In
the following section, we propose a duration analysis for exploring the determinants
of the time until a municipality decides to utilize a PFI/CP contract. Thanks to
this technique, we are able to explore the factors behind a municipality’s decision
to invest or wait in the period following 2004, when the new investment procedure
was introduced to the legal system. The following section is organized as follows.
First, we describe the duration analysis and we report the main results. Second,
we perform robustness checks to reinforce the validity of our empirical strategy.
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Finally, we propose an interpretation of our results by providing a comparison with
the theoretical literature previously discussed.
2.5.1 Duration analysis
Duration or survival analysis is an empirical technique for which time is the outcome
variable of interest. More precisely, the dependent variable is defined as survival
time because it provides the interval until a certain event (failure) occurs. The
terminology suggests the main application areas are health and financial economics.
However, this approach can be applied to any type of event that affects individuals
in different moments. Our research question is a suitable application of the duration
analysis inasmuch as more municipalities have invested in PPPs over the period 2005
to 2013. In our case, the investment action represents the event (failure), while the
survival time is given by the number of years until the investment takes place. In
such an analysis, we use the entire database composed of our treatment and control
groups. Thus, the time is right censoring for all municipalities that do not experience
the event prior to 2013.
Within this approach, two concepts must be introduced: the survivor function and
the hazard function. The first, S(t), gives the probability that an individual (or
municipality) will survive longer than time t. The hazard function provides the
instantaneous probability that investment (failure) will occur per unit of time. This
technique enables us to first, estimate and interpret the survivor function; second,
compare survivor and hazard functions; and third, assess the relationship between
explanatory variables and survival time. This approach allows us to identify the
factors that determines the probability to implement PPPs and how the new rule
affected this propensity to invest.
The introductory step of the survival analysis consists of the computation of the
Klapan-Meier survival curve and the Hazard rate function, h(t). The first is com-
puted year by year and reports the proportion of municipalities that survive (do not
invest) over time. The second gives the instantaneous potential per unit time for
the event to occur given the survival up to time t. The graphs are as follows.
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The first graph looks like a step function given the discrete time. Prior to 2005, the
survival probability equals 1, after which some municipalities started to invest. At
the end of the time period, the probability of investment is approximately 70%. This
result reflects the composition of our dataset, which comprises 95 municipalities that
invested in PFI/CP contracts and 202 control municipalities that did not implement
any PFI/CP. The hazard rate function highlights the increasing conditional proba-
bility to invest in PPPs up to year 2011. Subsequently, after the application of the
new accounting rule, the line shows a downward trend.
Our main goal is to assess the relationship between explanatory variables and sur-
vival time. We first approach the problem through a semi-parametric method, the
Cox proportional hazard model. This model makes a main assumption that the haz-
ard is proportional to the covariates (PH assumption). Thus, the effect of the budget
covariates on the survival risk is assumed to mainly depend on one measurement.
We perform a statistical test (stphtest) to assess the PH assumption. We implement
a PH global test that controls for all covariates simultaneously. Furthermore, we
graphically test the PH assumption for the budget constraint regressors (Table n. 6
appendix). Results of the proportional Cox model for the four budget proxies are
reported in Table n. 5 in the appendix.
We add the budget covariates to the regressions to test which element provides the
financial constraint effect by controlling for level of municipality investment, budget
results and level of subventions received from the government. These variables are
able to capture a municipality’s propensity to invest as well as its level of available
resources to meet the balanced budget requirements. The coefficients are negative,
except for that indicating the overall budget, but none are significant. In addition
to the budget covariates, we include the following in the regressions: three variables
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already used for the matching strategy that reflect population features (population,
income, and number of firms), and an institutional proxy (EQI), which is the Euro-
pean Quality of Government Index at the regional level (Charron, Lapuente et al.
2012).26. The matching covariates are used as a robustness check to further capture
differences among municipalities related to the demand side. None of these were
found to be significant. The EQI index controls for the municipality’s institutional
aspect; its coefficient is positive, but was not found to be significant.
More important for our analysis, however, is the effect of budget constraint proxies.
When we use debt and the annuity, we find positive and significant effects that con-
tinue to persist after 2011.27 While the rule was found to have a negative effect, this
was never significant. The rule becomes relevant for the last two proxies, namely
net CAF and the level of debt change in t − 1. The first was introduced to assess
whether or not the presence of municipality resources affects the propensity to im-
plement PFI/CP contracts for a given level of debt. Before 2011, the effect was not
significant, whereas after the new accounting law, the effect becomes highly positive
and significant (a 7.48% increase in the probability that the investment will occur).
This change can capture shifts in municipalities’ behavior. Before 2011, for a given
level of debt, the availability of resources for further investment did not affect the
propensity to implement PPPs. After the introduction of the rule, a municipality
showed a higher tendency to use PPPs when its budget is balanced and it can use
such a measure to create new investment resources. The last proxy captures the
increase or decrease of debt that occurred at time t − 1. Its effect was not signif-
icant either before or after the application of the rule. However, the coefficient of
the interrelation between the budget constraint proxy and the rule is negative and
significant. Hence, municipalities with a high debt ncrease were less likely to imple-
ment PPPs after the introduction of the 2011 legislation. Looking at the global test,
we can argue that the PH assumption is not violated in the implemented models.
We further control for whether or not the budget constraint proxies separately re-
spect the PH assumption. From graphs reported in Table n. 6, we can observe how
fitted curves appear horizontal, which means that the scaled Schoenfeld residuals
are independent with respect to survival time.
26This index is the combination of the level of corruption, protection of the rule of law, government
effectiveness, and accountability at regional levels in the 27 EU Member States. The measures
are collected in 172 EU regions, based on a survey of 34 000 residents across 18 countries
(Charron, Lapuente et al. 2012).
27Effects after 2011 are reported through the post 2011 statistic.
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The strategy’s next step consists of implementing a full parametric model where sur-
vival time is assumed to follow a known distribution. We assume the most common
Weibull distribution, which is a general distribution based on two parameters that
can be reduced to an exponential distribution if the hazard is assumed to be con-
stant over time. We run a parametric model for each proxy of the budget constraint.
Results are reported in table n. 7 in the appendix.
Outcomes of these regressions are substantially equal to the ones of the Cox propor-
tional Hazard model. Levels of debt or annuity increase the probability of investment
in PFI/CP contracts. These effects do not change with the rule’s application, and
the coefficients remain positive and significant after 2011. Conversely, the rule seems
more effective when the net CAF and debt-change proxies are used. In the first case,
this highlights how the presence of internal resources became a significant argument
in favor of PFI/CP investment, essentially after 2011. In the second case, the results
determine the rule’s impact on a proxy that reflects the municipality’s yearly budget
constraint. A graphical method for checking the validity of the Weibull distribution
is provided by examining the Klapan-Meier log curves against log survival time.
The graph reports a straight line; thus providing evidence that the distribution of
survival times follows a Weibull distribution.
2.5.2 Robustness checks
To validate our empirical strategy, we first perform several robustness checks related
to the previous regressions. As a second step, we propose alternative strategies to
answer our research question and compare the resulting outcomes with the ones
derived from the duration analysis.
The first robustness check concerns our matching strategy. We have already shown
how the treatment and control municipality groups are similar not only with respect
to the matching variables, but also by controlling for population characteristics re-
lated to the 2000 to 2009 time period. We include, as an additional test, all match-
ing variables in our duration regressions. Results are not substantially affected. A
further source of uncertainty remains in the interpretation of the interaction term
between the accounting rule and the budget constraint proxy. In fact, the policy’s
impact can be anticipated or identified with hindsight by public buyers. We control,
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using different thresholds,28 if the rule shows noticeable impacts in either previous
or following years, but did not find this to be the case. Furthermore, external fac-
tors could exist that influence the trend of the budget constraint proxy that are also
correlated with the PFI/CP dependent variables. An example would be a financial
crisis that could make PFI/CP investment more costly for the public buyer, espe-
cially when the latter is constrained in terms of total available resources (Marty and
Tran, 2013). This effect should overemphasize the rule’s potential impact, therefore
we would be potentially overestimating the size of the debt hiding motivations and
underestimating the relevance of alternative channels.
As a second step, we propose an alternative empirical strategy in order to check
whether or not our results depend on the adopted specification. We choose to im-
plement a panel strategy with a nonlinear model, where the dependent variable is
a dummy that equals 1 if municipality i invests in PFI/CP contracts during year
t. Applying a fixed-effect estimation with a nonlinear model can be problematic.
In fact, first differencing or using within a transformation does not permit elimina-
tion of unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, attempts to add municipality or time
dummy variables to the logit or probit estimations will result in biased estimators
due to the incidental parameters problem unless the time period is very large. A pos-
sible solution to this problem may come from using the traditional Random Effect
Probit. This strategy is appealing, but assumes that the unobserved components
are strictly exogenous and thus independent from our covariates. An alternative
approach would be the Mundlack estimation, which assumes an explicit function for
the latent variable. This method allows correlation between the random effect and
regressors and permits the marginal effects to be calculated. It can be applied to
our full sample and consists of computing a random effect logit or probit estimation
including the average value over time for each of our regressor municipalities. In this
paper, we first estimate the logit random effect. Results are reported in Table n. 8.
Subsequently, we implement the Mundlack approach. Results are reported in Table
n. 9.29 The results in the first table (table n. 8) do not substantially change with
respect to the duration analysis. As in the previous regressions, budget constraint
effects are relevant both before and after the rule’s application. The new accounting
law affects the impact of the net CAF proxy as well as the relevance of the new
debt taken out at time t− 1. When the Mundlack approach is followed, results are
28We control for every year and only found nonsignificant impacts.
29Tables report directly marginal effects.
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slightly different when debt and the debt change proxy are used. In the first case,
the debt coefficient is positive and significant before the application of the rule, but
is not significant after 2011. When the debt change proxy is used, the results are not
significant. Thus, using this specification, we find that the rule directly impacts the
stock of debt, and not only its short term change. The debt annuity (yearly debt
costs) continues to have a positive and significant impact after the rule’s application.
2.5.3 Economic interpretation
The initial goal of this paper was the test our hypotheses regarding the impact of
public budget constraints on organization’s investment choices. Following our em-
pirical analysis, we can state that a government’s choice of implementing a PFI/CP
is affected by its level of financial stress; furthermore, this impact cannot be exclu-
sively explained by the accounting advantages that normally characterize PFI/CP
projects. We therefore turn the discussion to examining the reasons that make
budget-constrained governments more inclined towards PFI/CP contracts. Apart
from the debt hiding motivations, alternative channels are suggested by the litera-
ture or are discussed at a practical level; i.e.,
• First, governments can face temporary liquidity constraints (Engel et al.,
2013). In such a case, the upfront spending required by TP can become more
expensive than the future transfers required by PPPs (the distortionary cost
of taxation is higher now than in the future). This benefit holds unless the
planner can decide to optimally postpone the project (Engel et al., 2013) or
TP repayment systems can be delayed by mimicking the timing allowed under
PPPs.30
• Second, the introduction of asymmetric information can affect the choice of
PPP or TP by giving relevance to the shadow cost of public funds. In fact,
through PPPs, governments can entrust the investment decision to better
informed agents (Auriol and Picard, 2013) or save incentive rents thanks to
the private agent’s long-term involvement (Buso, 2014).
• Next, alternative political channels resulting from relaxing the assumptions
of perfect benevolent governments can help to explain our results (Maskin &
30It is also important to highlight how high levels of public debt do not directly imply government
liquidity constraints.
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Tirole 2008).
• Finally, even after introduction of the 2011 rule, debt hiding motivations could
persist. This explanation should not be so relevant given the effectiveness of
the French ordinance in ruling out accounting advantages (see institutional
discussion).
With regard to our initial hypotheses, we can argue that the answer to the first
research question is solved in favor of the arguments proposed by Auriol & Picard
(2013) and Buso (2014); by contrast, the irrelevance theorem of Engel et al. (2013)
does not fit our data. Conversely, we cannot uphold the statement that new ac-
counting rule has been completely effective, nevertheless it is relevant for explaining
some results. In fact, when the legislation was applied, the overall trend of in-
vestment in PFI/CP contracts significantly decreased. Moreover, the rule partially
changed the relevance of budget constraints in explaining the propensity to invest
through PFI/CP contracts. This is evident when net CAF and debt change proxies
were used. The first proxy reflects the municipality’s capability to finance PFI/CP
investment with its own resources for a given debt level. The rule’s application
changed the reasons behind the municipality’s investment choice: before, the pres-
ence of internal resources was not a determinant of PFI/CP investment; after the
application of the rule, however, a strict relation between the investment and the
balance accounts was created, making a municipality’s investment decision directly
affected by the balanced budget requirements. The debt change variable confirms
the rule’s significant and negative impact on the budget constraint’s effect. This
channel is evident when a short term debt proxy is used, but is not as important
when debt stock is taken into account. However, it is plausible that what we capture
in terms of the rule’s effect on yearly debt should prompt decreases in the following
years of the long run budget constraints’ relevance.
Our results did not yield a perfect accord with the theoretical literature. In fact,
our outcomes are best understood by developing a theoretical framework to study
the role of both public and private budget constraints in a context of asymmetric
information and financial uncertainty. Moreover, this approach should be developed
together with a study of the political channels that can both explain the propensity
to invest through PPPs and be correlated with the municipality’s financial situation.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied whether or not a public authority burdened by a hard
budget constraint is more likely to choose PFI/CP; thereafter, we examine the nature
of this effect, i.e., is it only for debt hiding? We find that a budget constraint is
associated with higher use of PFI/CP. However, while the new accounting rule in
2011 might significantly change the temptation for municipalities to hide debt and
consequentially decrease the impact of financial pressure on employing a PFI/CP
investment, the budget constraint effect continues to be positive and significant for
some debt proxies. We therefore conclude that debt hiding is not the only motivation
when financially stressed municipalities choose PFI/CP investments.
Our empirical result contributes to the literature inasmuch as it does not merely
detect the effect of budget constraints, but looks at possible motivations that induce
constrained public authorities to choose PPPs; we ultimately discover that debt
hiding reasons are important but are not the only relevant factors. This paper is,
to the best of our knowledge, the first direct empirical analysis on this topic.
From a practical point of view, the paper can partially explain why countries have
increasingly turned to PPPs in recent years. In fact, a 2009 OECD report stated that
PPPs had grown to comprise a portion, although not the majority, of capital budgets
in several countries.31 This evolution experienced a temporary decline during the
current economic crisis (EPEC 2011), however, the long term trend is expected to be
positive (Wagenvoort et al., 2010). Our research addresses a very relevant problem
in the current situation where resources are scarce and much creativity is needed to
incentivize economic growth. Several extensions are possible and further research is
welcomed on the topic.
31The United Kingdom has had the longest experience, with PPPs currently comprising from 10%
to 15% of the capital budget in recent years. France and Korea have had similar experience,
with PPPs comprising 20% and 15% of those countries’ capital budgets respectively. Portugal
reported the highest payments for PPPs, representing nearly 28% of the national budget or
9.4% of GDP; projects could add up to nearly 20% of GDP eventually (OECD 2009).
74
2.7 Appendix

2.7 Appendix
Table 2.1: PS-TEST
Variable Treated    Control %bias   t            p>t
population_2009 35367         25448 12.5 1.35           0.181
population_1999 33663         24598 12.1 1.28           0.202
area 28626         31886 -3.1 -0.47          0.638
population_2009_men 16976         11728 14.2 1.38           0.169
accomodations_2009 19662         14281 12.9 1.25           0.213
main_residences_2009 16976         11728 14.2 1.38           0.169
second_residences_2009 1240.9        1517.9 -7.2 -0.43          0.667
vacant_accomodations_2009 1444.6        1034.6 11.8 1.24           0.217
owned_residences_2009 6965.3        5266.6 10.9 1.24           0.216
income_2009 4.7e+08      3.3e+08 13.0 1.32           0.189
taxpayers_2009 20678         14983 12.2 1.32           0.190
workers_2009 20195         14291 15.8 1.25           0.215
long_term_workers_2009 18327         13000 15.9 1.23           0.222
workers_1999 17857         12670 15.6 1.22           0.223
population_15-64_2009 23938         16610 14.0 1.41           0.159
unemployed_15-64_2009 2419           1658.1 13.3 1.43           0.155
employed_15-64_2009 16637         11732 14.0 1.38           0.169
total_firms_2010 3471.8        2432.9 12.8 1.34           0.181
agriculture_firms_2010 46.94          37.58 15.8 0.93           0.354
industry_firms_2010 155.95        118.12 11.6 1.25           0.214
construction_firms_2010 241.12        194.08 6.6 0.94           0.346
services_firms_2010 2466           1717.9 13.1 1.31           0.192
trade_firms_2010 702.65        536.27 10.7 1.09           0.279
public_firms 561.76        365.2 14.3 1.52           0.131
SMEs 998.84        706.87 13.7 1.34           0.183
No_SMEs 268.11        196.87 14.4 1.19           0.235
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Table 2.2: PS-TEST pre 2009
Variable Treated Control % bias  t          p>t          
taxpayers_08 26544 23728 3.3 0.24        0.808
net_income_08 5.8e+08 6.4e+08 -2.3 -0.16      0.874
total_tax_08 3.4e+07 5.5e+07 -6.1 -0.42      0.673
taxable_income_08 4.7e+08 5.5e+08 -3.2 -0.23      0.821
notaxable_income_08 1.1e+08 9.2e+07 6.6 0.51       0.611
taxpayers_07 26398 23598 3.3 0.24       0.808
net_income_07 5.7e+08 6.3e+08 -2.4 -0.17      0.867
total_tax_07 3.7e+07 5.9e+07 -6.0 -0.42      0.678
taxable_income_07 4.6e+08 5.5e+08 -3.3 -0.23      0.818
notaxable_income_07 1.0e+08 8.5e+07 7.0 0.54       0.591
taxpayers_06 26198 23445 3.3 0.24       0.810
net_income_06 5.4e+08 6.0e+08 -2.3 -0.16      0.873
total_tax_06 3.5e+07 5.5e+07 -6.0 -0.41      0.680
taxable_income_06 4.4e+08 5.2e+08 -3.2 -0.23      0.821
notaxable_income_06 1.0e+08 8.6e+07 6.7 0.51       0.610
taxpayers_05 25780 23239 3.0 0.22       0.823
net_income_05 4.2e+08 4.7e+08 -2.4 -0.17      0.864
taxpayers_04 25755 23259 3.0 0.22       0.827
net_income_04 4.1e+08 4.6e+08 -2.6 -0.18      0.856
taxpayers_03 25594 23261 2.8 0.20       0.839
net_income_03 4.0e+08 4.5e+08 -2.6 -0.18      0.854
taxpayers_02 25277 23001 2.7 0.20       0.841
net_income_02 3.8e+08 4.3e+08 -2.6 -0.18      0.855
taxpayers_01 24883 22830 2.5 0.18       0.855
net_income_01 3.6e+08 4.2e+08 -3.1 -0.22      0.826
taxpayers_00 24514 22288 2.8 0.20       0.840
net_income_00 3.5e+08 4.1e+08 -3.0 -0.21      0.833
taxpayers_99 24184 22021 2.7 0.20       0.843
net_income_99 3.4e+08 3.9e+08 -3.0 -0.21      0.834
taxpayers_98 23890 21870 2.6 0.19       0.852
net_income_98 2.1e+09 2.4e+09 -2.8 -0.19      0.846
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Table 2.3: Panel Dataset description
Group « PFI/CP » 95 obs Group « No PFI/CP » 202 obs
PFI/CP investment (€ mil) 32.3 0
PFI/CP choice 1 0
subventions (€ mil) 24.42 21.58
investment (€ mil) 26.2 29.9
current result (€ mil) 4.8 5.5
overall result (€ mil) 4.7 5.9
debt (€ mil) 63.6 45.2
debt per capite 137% 112%
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Table 2.4: Definition of variables and expected results
DIMENSION VARIABLE DEFINITION EXPECTED
RESULT
DEPENDANT VARIABLES
pfi− choiceit Equals to 1 if municipality i already invest in PFI/CP at time t
INDEPENDANT VARIABLES (all variables are defined as difference with the average of the reference group)
Budget constraint debtit−1 log of debt amount of each municipality at time t-1 +
annuityit−1 log of debt annuity of each municipality at time t-1 +
CAF − netit−1 log of the capability of self financing at t-1 -
debt− changeit−1 log of change in debt at t-1 +
Legal change rulet Equals to 1 since 2011; 0 otherwise -
rulet ∗ debtit−1 Interaction between the variable rule and debt -
rulet ∗
annuityit−1
Interaction between the variable rule and annuity -
rulet ∗ CAF −
netit−1
Interaction between the variable rule and CAF net +
rulet ∗ debt−
ch.it−1
Interaction between the variable rule and debt change -
Demand side populationi Equals to the log of the population of each municipality
incomei Equals to the log of oncome of each municipality
firmi Equals to the log of nb. of firm
Supply side Overall−
resultsit−1
Equals to the log of the budget result of municipality i at t-1
Current− resultsit−1 Equals to the log of the current budget result of
municipality i at t-1
Subventionsit−1 Equals to the log of the subventions of municipality i at
t-1
Investmentit−1 Equals to the log of the investment of municipality i at
t-1
-
Others EQIi Equals to the European Quality of Region Government
Index
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Table 2.5: Duration estimation: Cox PH Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
_t _t _t _t _t _t _t _t
overall_budget 0.0246 0.0259 0.00309 0.00714 0.00256 -0.00479 0.0948 0.0727
(0.06) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.25) (0.19)
current_budget 0.359 0.342 0.309 0.294 0.283 0.280 0.267 0.249
(0.80) (0.76) (0.67) (0.64) (0.65) (0.65) (0.64) (0.60)
subventions -0.319 -0.306 -0.300 -0.288 -0.273 -0.274 -0.176 -0.160
(-0.72) (-0.69) (-0.66) (-0.64) (-0.64) (-0.64) (-0.43) (-0.39)
investment -0.0671 -0.0659 -0.112 -0.112 -0.259 -0.277 -0.0116 -0.0215
(-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.44) (-0.43) (-0.96) (-1.04) (-0.05) (-0.08)
EQI -0.00629 -0.00522 -0.0100 -0.00899 -0.0338 -0.0347 -0.00635 -0.00382
(-0.19) (-0.16) (-0.31) (-0.28) (-0.88) (-0.90) (-0.19) (-0.11)
population -0.0139 -0.0143 -0.0140 -0.0144 -0.0197 -0.0207 -0.0126 -0.0132
(-0.70) (-0.72) (-0.70) (-0.72) (-0.96) (-1.01) (-0.62) (-0.65)
income 0.000315 -0.000224 0.000908 0.000327 -0.000742 0.00158 -0.000239 0.000818
(0.01) (-0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (-0.02) (0.04) (-0.01) (0.02)
firm -0.0463 -0.0470 -0.0820 -0.0806 0.0129 0.0104 0.0531 0.0522
(-0.77) (-0.78) (-1.33) (-1.31) (0.25) (0.20) (1.04) (1.02)
debt 0.142*** 0.173**
(2.61) (2.47)
rule_debt -0.0443
(-0.78)
annuity 0.254*** 0.286***
(3.14) (3.03)
rule_annuity -0.0525
(-0.76)
debt 0.349** 0.353**
(2.34) (2.38)
caf_net 0.0444* 0.0229
(1.83) (0.83)
rule_caf_net 0.0519
(1.46)
debt_change -0.00860 0.0187
(-0.61) (0.89)
rule_debt_ch. -0.0504*
(-1.75)
N 2395 2395 2395 2395 2348 2348 2394 2394
post2011 0.128** 0.234*** 0.0748** -0.0316
t 2.277 2.801 2.248 -1.596
PH gl. test (chi2) 5.87 5.02 5.38 4.23 6.68 6.56 7.85 5.20
p value 0.7529 0.8899 0.8644 0.9272 0.7554 0.8335 0.5498 0.8774
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: PH test for budget constraint regressors
Debt Rule*Debt
annuity Rule*annuity
Caf-net Rule*Caf-net
Debt-change Rule*Debt-Change
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Table 2.7: Parametric Survival Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
_t _t _t _t _t _t _t _t
population 0.0305 0.0314 0.0192 0.0219 0.00270 -0.00505 0.104 0.0847
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.27) (0.22)
income 0.384 0.374 0.339 0.328 0.302 0.294 0.284 0.270
(0.85) (0.82) (0.73) (0.71) (0.70) (0.68) (0.69) (0.66)
firm -0.352 -0.345 -0.343 -0.335 -0.298 -0.295 -0.208 -0.196
(-0.79) (-0.78) (-0.76) (-0.74) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.51) (-0.49)
EQI -0.0748 -0.0767 -0.118 -0.121 -0.268 -0.285 -0.0145 -0.0204
(-0.29) (-0.30) (-0.46) (-0.47) (-0.98) (-1.05) (-0.06) (-0.08)
overall_budget -0.00490 -0.00399 -0.00810 -0.00710 -0.0291 -0.0314 -0.00831 -0.00500
(-0.15) (-0.12) (-0.25) (-0.22) (-0.76) (-0.82) (-0.24) (-0.15)
current_budget -0.00983 -0.0101 -0.00954 -0.00984 -0.0155 -0.0162 -0.00784 -0.00920
(-0.49) (-0.51) (-0.48) (-0.49) (-0.76) (-0.80) (-0.39) (-0.45)
subventions 0.00362 0.00306 0.00603 0.00542 0.00224 0.00537 0.000164 0.00103
(0.09) (0.07) (0.14) (0.13) (0.05) (0.13) (0.00) (0.02)
investment -0.0475 -0.0479 -0.0761 -0.0743 0.0147 0.0101 0.0583 0.0573
(-0.78) (-0.78) (-1.23) (-1.20) (0.28) (0.19) (1.15) (1.13)
rule -0.688* -0.304 -0.694* -0.295 -0.713* -1.012** -0.705* -0.744*
(-1.81) (-0.45) (-1.82) (-0.44) (-1.88) (-2.37) (-1.84) (-1.92)
debt 0.144*** 0.172**
(2.63) (2.43)
rule_debt -0.0398
(-0.69)
annuity 0.248*** 0.280***
(3.06) (2.94)
rule_annuity -0.0511
(-0.72)
debt 0.347** 0.355**
(2.31) (2.37)
caf_net 0.0408* 0.0175
(1.70) (0.64)
rule_caf_net 0.0578
(1.60)
debt_change -0.0117 0.0169
(-0.83) (0.80)
rule_debt_ch. -0.0525*
(-1.82)
_cons -7074.4*** -7070.1*** -7098.7*** -7110.5*** -6924.5*** -6986.3*** -7075.9*** -7048.2***
(-5.23) (-5.23) (-5.26) (-5.27) (-5.11) (-5.15) (-5.22) (-5.17)
N 2395 2395 2395 2395 2348 2348 2394 2394
post2011 0.132 0.229 0.0754 -0.0356
t 2.327** 2.737*** 2.227** -1.794*
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Random Logit estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment
EQI 0.0550 0.0557 0.0516 0.0546 0.0849 0.0995 0.109 0.0784
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.22) (0.26) (0.28) (0.20)
population -0.00000192 -0.00000198 -0.00000171 -0.00000177 -0.00000161 -0.00000161 -0.00000236 -0.00000194
(-0.35) (-0.36) (-0.31) (-0.32) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.43) (-0.35)
income -0.0648 -0.0694 -0.127 -0.130 -0.150 -0.166 0.0373 0.0312
(-0.44) (-0.47) (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.89) (-0.98) (0.27) (0.22)
firm 0.0000293 0.0000294 0.0000260 0.0000259 0.0000233 0.0000246 0.0000293 0.0000239
(0.55) (0.55) (0.49) (0.49) (0.44) (0.46) (0.55) (0.45)
overall_budget -0.00828 -0.00680 -0.0121 -0.0107 -0.0249 -0.0249 -0.00770 -0.00462
(-0.25) (-0.20) (-0.37) (-0.33) (-0.65) (-0.65) (-0.22) (-0.13)
current_budget -0.0129 -0.0132 -0.0134 -0.0136 -0.0171 -0.0179 -0.0118 -0.0127
(-0.64) (-0.65) (-0.66) (-0.67) (-0.82) (-0.85) (-0.57) (-0.61)
subventions 0.00406 0.00341 0.00308 0.00234 -0.00227 -0.000815 0.00529 0.00643
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (-0.05) (-0.02) (0.12) (0.15)
investment -0.0425 -0.0437 -0.0785 -0.0771 0.0133 0.00980 0.0519 0.0498
(-0.69) (-0.71) (-1.23) (-1.21) (0.24) (0.18) (0.99) (0.95)
trend_rule -0.945** -0.943** -0.973** -0.971** -0.982** -0.993** -0.953** -0.932**
(-2.33) (-2.32) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.42) (-2.44) (-2.35) (-2.29)
debt 0.136** 0.173** 0.249* 0.248*
(2.43) (2.43) (1.81) (1.80)
rule_debt -0.0563
(-0.98)
annuity 0.244*** 0.284***
(2.95) (2.98)
rule_annuity -0.0667
(-0.97)
caf_net 0.0300 0.00204
(1.35) (0.08)
rule_caf_net 0.0704**
(1.99)
debt_change -0.00580 0.0203
(-0.41) (0.98)
rule_debt_ch. -0.0504*
(-1.74)
_cons 4.501 4.758 5.660 5.885 4.851 5.010 3.047 2.982
(1.18) (1.24) (1.47) (1.53) (1.27) (1.31) (0.81) (0.80)
N 2950 2950 2950 2950 2898 2898 2655 2655
post2011 0.117 0.217 0.0724 -0.0302
t 2.038** 2.551** 2.219 ** -1.475
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Chamberlain’s Random Logit estimation
(1) (2) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment
EQI 0.141 0.126 0.193 0.194 0.237 0.273 0.267 0.248
(0.35) (0.31) (0.47) (0.47) (0.60) (0.69) (0.68) (0.62)
population -0.00000131 -0.00000136 -0.00000731 -0.00000817 -0.00000116 -0.000000779 -0.00000224 -0.00000193
(-0.24) (-0.25) (-1.02) (-1.12) (-0.20) (-0.13) (-0.40) (-0.35)
income -0.0386 -0.0321 -0.0430 -0.0235 -0.180 -0.191 0.0301 0.0241
(-0.23) (-0.19) (-0.25) (-0.13) (-0.95) (-1.00) (0.20) (0.16)
firm 0.0000233 0.0000231 0.0000180 0.0000267 0.0000157 0.0000148 0.0000287 0.0000247
(0.43) (0.43) (0.32) (0.46) (0.29) (0.26) (0.53) (0.46)
overall_budget -0.00194 0.00108 -0.00136 0.00170 -0.0271 -0.0278 -0.00357 0.00186
(-0.05) (0.03) (-0.04) (0.05) (-0.67) (-0.69) (-0.10) (0.05)
current_budget -0.0103 -0.0103 -0.00943 -0.00763 -0.0155 -0.0162 -0.00797 -0.00829
(-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.45) (-0.37) (-0.73) (-0.76) (-0.38) (-0.40)
subventions -0.00805 -0.00752 -0.0128 -0.0114 -0.00902 -0.00871 -0.00744 -0.00595
(-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.27) (-0.24) (-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.16) (-0.13)
investment -0.0306 -0.0267 -0.0517 -0.0527 -0.0175 -0.0187 -0.00537 -0.00373
(-0.43) (-0.37) (-0.71) (-0.72) (-0.25) (-0.26) (-0.07) (-0.05)
trend_rule -0.945** -0.949** -0.973** -0.970** -0.972** -0.994** -0.943** -0.925**
(-2.32) (-2.33) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.43) (-2.32) (-2.27)
debt 0.117 0.202* -0.561 -0.525
(1.19) (1.75) (-1.62) (-1.52)
rule_debt -0.183
(-1.35)
annuity 0.242** 0.257**
(2.33) (2.30)
rule_annuity -0.0273
(-0.38)
caf_net 0.0395 -0.00423
(1.63) (-0.15)
rule_caf_net 0.105**
(2.39)
debt_change -0.0119 0.00693
(-0.79) (0.31)
rule_debt_ch. -0.0380
(-1.23)
_cons 3.988 4.130 4.201 4.005 4.635 4.907 2.875 2.865
(0.99) (1.03) (1.03) (0.97) (1.17) (1.23) (0.74) (0.74)
N 2950 2950 2950 2950 2898 2898 2655 2655
post2011 0.0196 0.230** 0.101** -0.0310
t 0.164 2.138 2.697 -1.434
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
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3 Public and Private Finance of
PPPs
Author: Marco Buso
Abstract
This theoretical paper studies the effect of public and private budget constraints
on the government’s choice between Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and Tra-
ditional Procurement (TP) mechanisms. Differently from the previous literature, I
introduce private limited liability and public budget constraints in a context charac-
terized by asymmetric information. In this framework, private agents are protected
in case of bad outcomes from the probability of failure. Furthermore, public transfers
are socially costly for the government.
Under PPPs, the private consortium, thanks to its long term commitment in the
project, owns an implicit incentive to invest during the building stage. As a conse-
quence, the agent can accept higher levels of risks and the the government can save
money in the form of incentive rents.
This paper provides a theoretical explanation for the empirical evidence which shows
how budget constrained governments are more apt to choose PPPs (Hammami et
al., 2006; Albalate et al., 2012; Russo and Zampino, 2010; Krumm and Mause, 2012;
Buso et al., 2013). The result is not derived from the presence of private financ-
ing, but it comes from the introduction of asymmetric information in conditions of
financial stress.
3.1 Introduction
The involvement of private companies for the realization and provision of public
goods and services is not a recent practice; it has been adopted since the introduction
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of concession contracts in the legal system. Nevertheless, programs launched in the
early 1990s in the UK and other countries to enhance public-private partnerships
(PPPs) differ from traditional forms of public-private collaboration by the greater
emphasis placed on "value for money”1.
Since the 1990s, the importance of PPPs in public sector infrastructure substantially
increased until the onset of the financial crisis, which downsized the phenomenon.
The main factors driving this growth have been: 1) the possibility of new sources
of financing, 2) the optimal allocation of risks among agents and the incentives
provided by bundling structures2. It is not clear which of these elements can best
explain the advantages of PPPs, and the advantages claimed by practitioners are not
always in accordance with theory. For instance, governments and private contractors
highlight both the efficiency gains of PPPs and their ability to release public funds.
The theoretical literature emphasizes, however, the potential efficiency advantages
or disadvantages of PPPs, while it doesn’t support their ability to relieve strained
budgets (Engel et a. 2013).
In contrast to the theoretical literature, empirical evidence shows that tax burden
and debt stress levels are important elements in explaining the preferences of coun-
tries or municipalities towards PPPs (Hammami et al., 2006; Albalate et al., 2012;
Russo and Zampino, 2010; Krumm and Mause 2012). None of the previous works
clarify, however, the nature of this effect, i.e. whether this impact is driven by po-
litical motivations (debt hiding). Buso et al. (2014) delve further in their analysis.
Applying a natural experiment to the French context, they show how political (debt
hiding) reasons are not sufficient to explain why municipalities burdened by strict
budget constraints are more apt to choose PPPs.
This paper contributes to the theoretical financial literature regarding PPPs by
analyzing whether the efficiency advantages of PPPs increase with the financial
constraints of collectivities. The analysis shows a positive impact of PPPs on the
government budget. This effect is not derived from the introduction of private
financing, but is based on an efficiency gains. This can explain the empirical results
1The “value for money” analysis evaluates the economic sustainability of the project and it defines
the optimal allocation of risks between the public and the private partners.
2An important characteristic of PPPs is the assignment of different phases of the project to a single
consortium made of more agents. This bundling agreement includes several activities depending
on the choice of contract, some examples are: the BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer), the
BOOT (Build Operate Own and Transfer) or the FDBO (Finance, Design, Build, Operate,
Transfer)
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found by Buso et al. (2014).
The paper is structured in four main sections: Section 1 discusses the related lit-
erature; Section 2 presents the model; Section 3 compares PPPs and TP using a
welfare analysis; finally, section 4 concludes.
3.2 Related literature review
Most of the theoretical papers aim to testing the positive and negative impact of
PPPs on TP mechanisms in the form of social welfare. PPPs can encourage cost-
reducing innovations (Hart, 2003; Bennet and lossa, 2006) and, when the externality
between the building and the operational phase is positive, quality-enhancing in-
vestments (Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; lossa and Martimort, 2008). Nevertheless,
because of the early commitment required, they don’t allow for needed flexibility in
the face of uncertain future determinants (lossa and Martimort, 2008; 2011; Mar-
timort and Straub, 2012). Space for welfare-improving PPPs is further restricted
when there are: 1) limitations on the governments’ ability to commit for long term
projects (Guash et al., 2005; Valero, 2013); 2) soft budgets and re-negotiations (de
Bettignies and Ross, 2008; Engel et al., 2009); and 3) the presence of a government’s
preference for a favored group (Maskin and Tirole, 2007).
On the other hand, when determining at the optimal degree of private involve-
ment in public projects, a major role is played by distortionary costs of financing
(Atkinson and Stern, 1974) and uncertainty (Arrow and Lind, 1970). Deregulation
of non-competitive sectors implies a trade-off between benefits for taxpayers and
costs for consumers, where privatization is more likely to be the solution the higher
the shadow cost of public funds (Auriol and Picard, 2007) and the more ex post
renegotiations are allowed (Auriol and Picard, 2009). This trade off also persists
when ‘build operate transfer’ (BOT) concession contracts and public regimes are
compared (Auriol and Picard, 2013). In such a case, governments’ incentive to opt
for BOT contracts increase the higher the degree of asymmetric information, the
larger the shadow cost of public funds, and the larger the business risk.
Nevertheless, distortionary taxation is not always an argument in favor of private
involvement. Engel et al. (2013) develop a model where a large government able to
diversify risk contracts with a risk averse firm for a small project. In such a context,
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the government savings during the early investment of the PPP are perfectly offset
by future revenue flows. Hence, the shadow cost of public funds can affect the
analysis only when it changes over time (liquidity constraints).
In this paper I develop a stylized model where the government must choose be-
tween contracting out the realization of a multi-stage project to a single consortium
(PPPs) or distributing the several investment stages to different agents (Traditional
Procurement - TP). The model is developed in a context of asymmetric information
(moral hazard). Furthermore, public institutions face budget limitations (public
budget constraint)3, while, different to the previous literature, private firms are
restrained in the financial resources they can collect (private limited liability con-
straints)4. The analysis follows the approach of Engel et al. (2013) but introducing
further financial aspects that characterize the current investment environment.
3.3 The model
In the model, the government acts as a principal and must implement a public in-
vestment composed of two stages: an infrastructure component and the management
of the completed infrastructure.
During the first stage, the agent must build an asset of size q that generates a surplus
for the public. The surplus function S(q) is increasing and concave with respect to
the investment size Sq > 0, Sqq ≤ 0. Furthermore, depending on the builder’s action,
it can be equal to Sl(q) or Sh(q) > Sl(q). The builder can exercise a high level of
effort: e1 = 1, sustaining a marginal cost equal to c(1) = c1 or a low level: e1 = 0,
having a marginal cost equal to c(0) = c0 < c1. In the first case, the probability to
achieve a high level of surplus, Sh(q), is v1, otherwise it’s equal to v0 < v1.
During the second phase there is still a problem of hidden action. Namely, the
operator can exercise a high level of effort: e2 = 1, suffering a non monetary cost
equal to ψ(1) = ψ or a low level: e2 = 0, having a marginal cost equal to ψ(0) = 0.
3They haven’t the power to increase the current spending with the promise to raise future taxes
because of excessive levels of public debts.
4Martimort & Straub (2012) develop an analysis with private limited liability constraints; how-
ever, they didn’t focus their study on the financial features of PPPs.
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The government cannot directly verify the effort, but he can observe the impact of
the operational activity on the final levels of social surplus5, which depend on the
effort expended in the first stage6. Indeed, when the construction results in a social
surplus equal to Sh(q), the operator has a probability to maintain the same level of
surplus during the management period equal either to pih1 if he implements a high
level of effort or pih0 < pih1 if the operator exerts a low level. Nevertheless, when
the social welfare function at the end of the building activity is equal to Sl(q), the
operator can obtain a consumer surplus of Sh(q) with either probability pil1 when e2 =
1 or pil0 < pil1 otherwise. As a matter of fact, effort during the investment stage shifts
the probability distribution towards higher expected realizations of the operational
activity: pih > pil. Without loss of generality, the model furtherly assumes that
∆pih = ∆pil. The design of the model is summarized through the following diagram:
The sequential phases of the project could be assigned to two separate agents or
to a single consortium. In the first case there are two contracts and an unbundled
structure (TP), in the second case there is a consortium made of two agents and a
single contract that regulates both activities (PPPs). These organizational choices
are compared in the following paragraphs.
5This outcome can be evaluated by different measures, such as the availability of public asset to
the final consumers.
6If, for instance, the infrastructure construction experiences a significant delivery delay, the op-
erational phase experience a shorter activity period due to a decreased need for the public
services.
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3.3.1 Unbundling - TP
In the “unbundling”, the government assigns the two stages of the project to different
agents: the builder and the operator. These players act autonomously and the
government offers two different contracts.
1. In the first phase, the principal offers a transfer contingent on the achievement
of a high level of surplus: Sh(q). In case of success, the subsidy is equal to
th1 , otherwise the punishment is equal to tl1 (th1 > tl1). These values are set in
order to induce the participation of the builder and to create an incentive for
a high level of effort. Furthermore, the government must take into account the
limited liability constraint in case of unsuccessful outcome; it reflects the risk
aversion of the agent and it represents a limit to the government’s ability to
apply a punishment.
2. In the second phase, the government offers a transfer contingent on the final
outcome. Specifically, if the final users’ surplus results equal to Sh(q) the
transfer correspond to th2 , otherwise the penalty is equal to tl2 (th2 > tl2). The
amount of the subsidy is set with the purpose of making the operator par-
ticipate in the contract and provide high levels of effort. Also in this phase
the operator is protected in the event of bad outcomes by a limited liability
constraint.
After the contractual agreements, the two agents are left with a payoff that is re-
spectively equal to:
• U1 = E[t1]− c(e)q for the builder;
• U2 = E[t2]− ψ(e) for the operator.
Taking into account the setting described above, the government maximizes its con-
strained net payoff to decide on the size of the investment and the adequate amount
of transfers. The welfare function is the difference between the expected users’ sur-
plus and the expected transfers. The utilities of the agents must be higher than the
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reservation values that are equal to 07. Moreover, the agents are protected by lim-
ited liability constraints in the event of an unsuccessful outcome and their utilities
are set to provide an incentive for high levels of effort. Finally, the government must
own an adequate amount of resources (K) to satisfy the contractual requirements.
The maximization problem is solved through a backward induction strategy.
Proof. See appendix 1
The final results are summarized by the following table.
Results
q v1[pih1Shq (q) + (1− pih1 )Slq (q)] + (1− v1)[pil1Shq (q) + (1− pil1)Slq (q)] = (v1 + β) ∆c∆v
t1 tl1 = 0; th1 = q∆c∆v ;
t2 tl2 = 0; th2 = ψ∆pi
The optimal investment size derives from the equality between the expected marginal
benefit (left hand size) and the expected marginal cost (right hand size). The
expected marginal surplus is computed considering the probability distribution over
the two periods when agents implement high levels of effort. The expected marginal
costs take into account the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint (β ) that
captures the distortion imposed to taxpayers for collecting funds needed for the
investment.
Limited liability constraints result always more stringent compared to participation
constraints. That’s the reason why the level of transfers in case of bad outcomes are,
in equilibrium, equal to zero, both in the building and operation stages. Transfers in
cases of good final outcomes are accordingly adjusted taking furtherly into account
incentive compatibility constraints.
7The Participation constraints are never binding because the limited liability constraints are
always more stringent.
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3.3.2 Bundling - PPPs
In the “bundling” framework the government hires a single consortium of two firms
for both the construction and the operation stages of the project. The setting and
the initial assumptions are very similar to the unbundling scenario, but a single
contract is submitted. The deal is composed by two transfers, one for each stage of
the project. The resulting utility of the consortium is equal to:
• U1 = E[t1] + E[t2]− c(e)q − ψ(e)
During both investment phases there is a problem of hidden action. The government
maximizes its ex ante gross surplus net of the expected payments granted to the
consortium. The principal has to induce the agent to both participate in the project
and provide a high level of effort. Moreover, the consortium cannot be excessively
punished in case of an unsuccessful outcome and the government must own adequate
resources to cover the maximum total expenses. The maximization problem aims
to define the optimal levels of investment and transfers.
Proof. See appendix 2
The final results are reported in the following table:
Results
q v1[pih1Shq (q) + (1− pih1 )Slq (q)] + (1− v1)[pil1Shq (q) + (1− pil1)Slq (q)] = (v1 + β) ∆c∆v
t th1 − tl1 = ∆c∆v q − (pih1 − pil1)( ψ∆pi ); th2 − tl2 = ψ∆pi ; tl1 + tl2 = 0
Similarly to the unbundling scenario, the optimal investment size is set equaliz-
ing the marginal benefit with the marginal cost deriving from an additional unit
of investment. Concerning the level of transfers, it’s interesting to observe that,
differently from the previous scenario, the limited liability constraint is considered
over the two periods and the builder’s incentive compatibility constraint takes into
account the impact that the first stage has in probabilities into the second stage.
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3.4 Welfare analysis
This section performs a welfare analysis to analyze the pros and cons of choosing
a PPP. As a working hypothesis, I propose that the gross surplus of a benevolent
government is respectively equal to: Sh(q) = 2ln(q) in case of a successful outcome,
and Sl(q) = ln(q) otherwise8. Starting from these assumptions, it is possible to
compare the total production of the unbundled and the bundled structures and the
subsequent value functions.
Proof. See appendix 3
The final results are summarized by the following table:
Quantity
Unbundling - TP qU = K−
ψ
∆pi
∆c
∆v
Bundling - PPPs qB = K−
ψ
∆pi [1−(pih1−pil1)]
∆c
∆v
Surplus
Unbundling - TP V U = lnqU [v1(1 + pih1 ) + (1− v1)(1 + pil1)]− v1K + ψ∆pi (v1 − v1pih1 − (1− v1)pil1)
Bundling - PPPs V B = lnqB[v1(1 + pih1 ) + (1− v1)(1 + pil1)]− v1K + ψ∆pi (v1 − v1pih1 − (1− v1)pil1)
Outcomes in both settings depend from K and are strictly comparable. In fact, the
difference between PPPs and TP is always positive and it is equal to:
[v1(1 + pih1 ) + (1− v1)(1 + pil1)][lnqB − lnqU ]
Given the initial assumption: pih1 > pil1, PPPs are always preferred and this advan-
tage increases as available government resources (K) decrease9. The analysis allows
8These specific functions satisfy the initial assumptions of the model.
9In the appendix it can be observed that the difference comes form the Lagrangian multiplier of
the budget constraint.
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us to understand the final results in light of the moral hazard issue and the finan-
cial constraints. A bundled structure with a long term contract is more likely to
accept the transfer of endogenous risks. As a consequence, a budget-constrained
government offering contracts contingent on adequate performance is able to im-
plement a project that is less costly in terms of final rents. Put differently, the
private agents ask the government for an insurance cost due to a higher degree of
risk aversion10. In the case of PPPs, the investment perspective of the private agent
is longer, therefore the consortium has an implicit incentive that lowers the required
insurance premium. It is important to highlight how this benefit does not result
from the involvement of private finance, but rather from the optimal transfer of
risks in a context of asymmetric information. This enriches the analysis of Engel et
al. (2013), but doesn’t directly contrast the "irrelevance theorem". The analytical
result can be graphically described by an example:
Table 3.1: Simulation analysis
The simulation analysis has been performed based on the level of available public
resources. When there are low values of K, TP is preferred to PPPs. As K in-
creases, the government budget constraint is less relevant for the analysis and the
two organizational structures are more similar in terms of ex ante net surplus.
10The higher degree of risk aversion comes from the limited liability constraints.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, two organizational choices are compared: PPPs (bundling) and TP
(unbundling). Most studies on PPPs focus on the same research question, while
the financial aspect of the problem is often neglected. In the model presented, the
approach is similar to that in the related literature in that there is a project made
of two related stages. However, in this study both government and private partners
are constrained in their capacity to collect the needed funds.
The motivation of the paper is similar to that of Engel et al. (2013), but the frame-
work better reflects the current situation of public and private financial markets.
Because of this environment, private players can not be excessively punished due to
the risk of failure and the government has limited resources to provide investment
incentives. PPPs imply a long term relationship between government and private
agents. Thanks to this commitment, the consortium is more willing to accept the
transfer of risks, therefore the government can enhance the building investment
maximizing the level of rent extraction.
The model is still very preliminary and incomplete, but the topic is extremely rel-
evant given the current situation, where public resources are scarce and private
markets are risky. Several extensions are possible to include different aspects that
are not captured by this theoretical framework.
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3.6 Appendix
1 - Unbundling - Maximization proof 1
First-step - Maximization problem of the second stage11
max
th2 ,t
l
2
pii1S
h (q) + (1− pii1)Sl (q)− pii1th2 − (1− pii1)tl2
s.t.
1) pii1th2 + (1− pii1)tl2 − ψ ≥ 0 (µ)
2) pii1th2 + (1− pii1)tl2 − ψ ≥ pii0th2 + (1− pii0)tl2 (λ)
3) tl2 ≥ 0 (γ)
4) th1 + th2 ≤ K (β)
Results12:
tl2 = 0
th2 = ψ∆pi
Second-step - Maximization problem of the first stage13
max
q,th1 ,t
l
1
v1{pih1Sh (q) + (1− pih1 )Sl (q)− th1 − pih1 ψ∆pi}
+(1− v1){pil1Sh (q) + (1− pil1)Sl (q)− tl1 − pil1 ψ∆pi}
s.t.
11i = h or l depending of the first phase outcome.
12Given that the limited libility constraint is always binding and because of the assumption ∆pih =
∆pil, the maximization problem of the operator leads to the same results whatever is the
outcome of the building activity.
13It is assumed that the limited liability constraint is always more binding than the participation
constraint, in this case it is equivalent to assume that c0v1 < c1v0; i.e the cost in case of low
level of effort must not be too high.
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1) v1th1 + (1− v1)tl1 − c1q ≥ 0 (α)
2) v1th1 + (1− v1)tl1 − c1q ≥ v0t1 + (1− v0)tl1 − c0q (η)
3) tl1 ≥ 0 (δ)
4) th1 + th2 ≤ K (β)
Lagrangian function14
L = v1{pih1Sh (q) + (1− pih1 )Sl (q)− th1 − pih1 ψ∆pi}
+(1− v1){pil1Sh (q) + (1− pil1)Sl (q)− tl1 − pil1 ψ∆pi}
+η
(
v1t
h
1 + (1− v1)tl1 − c1q − v0th1 − (1− v0)tl1 + c0q
)
+γ(tl1)
+β(K − th1 − th2)
First order conditions
dL
dq
:v1[pih1Shq (q) + (1− pih1 )Slq (q)] + (1− v1)[pil1Shq (q) + (1− pil1)Slq (q)] = η∆c
dL
dth1
:−v1 + η∆v − β = 0
dL
dtl1
:−(1− v1)− η∆v + γ = 0
Results:
v1[pih1Shq (q) + (1− pih1 )Slq (q)] + (1− v1)[pil1Shq (q) + (1− pil1)Slq (q)] = (v1 + β) ∆c∆v
tl1 = 0
th1 = q∆c∆v
14The participation constrain is never binding
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2 - Bundling - Maximization proof 2
Maximization problem of the government’s objective function over the two stages15
max
q,th1 ,t
l
1,t
h
2 ,t
l
2
v1{pih1Sh (q) + (1− pih1 )Sl (q)− th1 − pih1 th2 − (1− pih1 )tl2}
+(1− v1){pil1Sh (q) + (1− pil1)Sl (q)− tl1 − pil1th2 − (1− pil1)tl2}
s.t.
1) v1[th1 + pih1 th2 + (1− pih1 )tl2 − ψ] + (1− v1)[tl1 + pil1th2 + (1− pil1)tl2 − ψ]− c1q ≥ 0
(µ)
2) v1[th1 + pih1 th2 + (1− pih1 )tl2 − ψ] + (1− v1)[tl1 + pil1th2 + (1− pil1)tl2 − ψ]− c1q ≥
v0[th1 + pih1 th2 + (1− pih1 )tl2 − ψ] + (1− v0)[tl1 + pil1th2 + (1− pil1)tl2 − ψ]− c0q (η)
3) v1[th1 + pih1 th2 + (1− pih1 )tl2 − ψ] + (1− v1)[th1 + pil1th2 + (1− pil1)tl2 − ψ]− c1q ≥
v1[th1 + pih0 th2 + (1− pih0 )tl2] + (1− v1)[th1 + pil0th2 + (1− pil0)tl2]− c1q (λ)
4) tl1 + tl2 ≥ 0 (γ)
6) th1 + th2 ≤ K (β)
Lagrangian function16
L = v1{pih1Sh (q) + (1− pih1 )Sl (q)− th1 − pih1 th2 − (1− pih1 )tl2}
+(1− v1){pil1Sh (q) + (1− pil1)Sl (q)− tl1 − pil1th2 − (1− pil1)tl2}
+η
(
∆v[th1 − tl1 + (pih1 − pil1)(th2 − tl2)]− c1q + c0q
)
+λ
(
∆pi(th2 − tl2)− ψ
)
+γ(tl1 + tl2)
+β(K − th1 − th2)
15Even within this framework, it is assumed for simplicity that the limited liability constraint
is always more binding than the participation constraint. It is important to highlight that
in the bundling case the limited liability constraint is less easily binding with respect to the
undundling case. Therefore, with this assumption, we are underestimating the potential benefit
of bundling.
16The participation constrain is never binding
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First order conditions
dL
dq
:v1[pih1Shq (q) + (1− pih1 )Slq (q)] + (1− v1)[pil1Shq (q) + (1− pil1)Slq (q)] = η∆c
dL
dth1
:−v1 + η∆v − β = 0
dL
dtl1
:−(1− v1)− η∆v + γ = 0
dL
dth2
:−v1pih1 − (1− v1)pil1 + λ∆pi + η∆v(pih1 − pil1)− β = 0
dL
dtl2
:−v1(1− pih1 )− (1− v1)(1− pil1)− λ∆pi − η∆v(pih1 − pil1) + γ = 0
Results:
v1[pih1Shq (q) + (1− pih1 )Slq (q)] + (1− v1)[pil1Shq (q) + (1− pil1)Slq (q)] = (v1 + β) ∆c∆v
th1 − tl1 = ∆c∆vq − (pih1 − pil1)( ψ∆pi )
th2 − tl2 = ψ∆pi
tl1 + tl2 = 0
3 - Welfare analysis
Given the assumptions: Sh(q) = 2ln(q); Sl(q) = ln(q); the optimal investment size
and the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint become:
Investment size
Unbundling qU = v1(1+pi
h
1 )+(1−v1)(1+pil1)
(v1+β) ∆c∆v
β = v1(1+pi
h
1 )+(1−v1)(1+pil1)
K− ψ∆pi
− v1
Bundling qB = v1(1+pi
h
1 )+(1−v1)(1+pil1)
(v1+β) ∆c∆v
β = v1(1+pi
h
1 )+(1−v1)(1+pil1)
K− ψ∆pi (1−(pih1−pil1))
− v1
Substituting in the government objective function, we can compute the value func-
tions under bundling and unbundling:
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Net Surplus
Unbundling
v1[pih1 2ln
(
qU
)
+ (1− pih1 )ln
(
qU
)
] + (1− v1)[pil12ln
(
qU
)
+ (1− pil1)ln
(
qU
)
]
−v1pih1 ψ∆pi − (1− v1)pil1 ψ∆pi − v1qU ∆c∆v
Bundling
v1[pih1 2ln
(
qU
)
+ (1− pih1 )ln
(
qU
)
] + (1− v1)[pil12ln
(
qU
)
+ (1− pil1)ln
(
qU
)
]
−v1pih1 ψ∆pi − (1− v1)pil1 ψ∆pi − v1[qU ∆c∆v − (pih1 − pil1)( ψ∆pi )]
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